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ARTICLES

KOREMATSU REVISITED-CORRECTING THE
INJUSTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY GOVERNMENT
EXCESS AND LAX JUDICIAL REVIEW: TIME FOR A
BETTER ACCOMMODATION OF NATIONAL
SECURITY CONCERNS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
Eric K. Yamamoto*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1942, the federal government convicted Fred Korematsu for
refusing to abide by the military's wartime exclusion orders. Those
orders precipitated the mass internment without indictment or hearing of over 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, including 70,000
American citizens.
The Supreme Court affirmed Korematsu's conviction in 1944.1
The Court rejected Korematsu's constitutional challenge to the orders, declaring that the Court "could not reject as unfounded" the
government's assertion that "military necessity" justified such unprecedented action against a racial group.'
In its deliberations, the Court failed to scrutinize carefully the
factual basis of the military's claim of necessity. The official record
was bereft of evidence supporting this claim. Looking beyond the
record, the Court in effect took judicial notice of the government's
1986 by Eric K. Yamamoto
Assistant Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa; J.D., Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley. The author, who
served as one of several litigation co-counsel to Fred Korematsu on his coram nobis petition, is
especially grateful to the Korematsu Legal Team and particularly Edward Chen for his invaluable research, editing, and advice. The author is also indebted to the historical work of author
and professor Peter Irons.
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu was convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 979 (1942) (originally enacted as PUB. L. No. 503, 56 Stat. 173. Congress enacted
the law on March 21, 1942, and thereby made the knowing violation of a military order a
misdemeanor punishable by prison and a fine.
2. 323 U.S. at 214, 218-19.
O
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proferred general conclusions concerning both racial stereotypes and
the danger of espionage and sabotage which was allegedly posed by
West Coast Japanese Americans.' Indeed, a multitude of official
documents which contained conclusions directly contrary to those advanced by the government were shielded from judicial review.
According to recent judicial decisions, those now declassified
government documents, many of which were discovered through
Freedom of Information Act requests, revealed two extraordinary
facts: first, government intelligence services unequivocally informed
the highest officials of the military and of the War and Justice Departments that the West Coast Japanese as a group posed no serious
danger to the war effort and that no need for mass evacuation existed;4 and second, that the Supreme Court was deliberately misled
about the "military necessity" which formed the basis of the Korematsu decision.8
Based upon these recently discovered documents, Fred Korematsu filed a Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis on January
19, 1983 seeking to vacate his forty year-old conviction. On November 10, 1983, United States District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, find7
ing "manifest injustice," granted the Petition on the merits.
3. See infra section lIB.
4. See infra section IIA, Horhi v. United States, No. 84-5460, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1986)
"It is now apparent that there were no countervailing professional intelligence analyses justifying the need for mass evacuation based on the rule." Id.
5. See infra note 7.
6. A writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary writ which operates to correct fundamental
errors or to prevent manifest injustice in criminal proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970);
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954). It is the substantive equivalent of a writ of
habeas corpus. The primary difference between the two is that the writ of coram nobis is
operative even after the petitioner's sentence is served and the petitioner is no longer in government custody. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510-11; Taylor v. United States, 648 F.2d 565, 573 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981). Prosecutorial misconduct in "knowingly usling] perjured testimony or with[holding] materially favorable evidence" is grounds for issuance of the
writ. Taylor, 648 F.2d at 571.
7. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The conclusion to
Judge Patel's opinion aptly summarizes the basis of the district court's decision to vacate Korematsu's conviction.
[Tihere is substantial support in the record that the government deliberately
omitted relevant information and provided misleading information in papers
before the [Supreme] Court. The information was critical to the Court's determination [of military necessity[ .... Because the information was of the kind
peculiarly within the government's knowledge, the Court was dependent upon
the government to provide a full and accurate account. Failure to do so presents
the "compelling circumstance" contemplated by Morgan. The judicial process is
seriously impaired when the government's law enforcement officers violate their
ethical obligations to the court.
Id. at 1420.
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The government's misrepresentations to the Court in Korematsu and the following cover-up preceded Watergate by thirty
years, with far more tragic consequences. 8 In accepting without close
scrutiny the government's claim of necessity, the Court not only legitimized the dislocation and imprisonment of loyal citizens without
trial solely on account of race, but it also weakened a fundamental
tenet of American democracy-government accountability for military control over civilians. Justice Jackson, in his scathing dissent,
pinpointed the dangerous latent principle of Korematsu. "What the
Court appears to be doing, whether consciously or not . .. [is] to
distort the Constitution to approve all the military may deem expedient." 9 Korematsu has never been explicitly overruled by the Court,
See also Hohri v. United States, No. 84-5460, slip
op. "And taken together, the suppression of the Ringle Report and the absence of countervailing data suggest the Justice Department misled the Supreme Court when it argued that military necessity justified the mass evacuation of Japanese Americans." Id.
The government did not file a substantive opposition to the Korematsu petition although
the Court had set a specific deadline for such a response and had granted two extensions. The
Court deemed the government's failure to respond on the merits "tantamount to a confession of
error." 584 F. Supp. at 1413. The government appealed Judge Patel's decision and later withdrew its appeal.
8. The effect of the concealment of documents on the running of the statute of limitations for the internees' property loss claims against the government was addressed in Hohri v.
United States, No. 84-5460, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1986). In Hohri, the district court dismissed
the internees' fifth amendment taking claims, among others, as time-barred because certain of
the documents relied upon by the internees were available to the public shortly after the war.
The court of appeals reversed. The court noted that the 1944 Korematsu decision which upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation on military necessity grounds foreclosed any taking
claims. The finding of military necessity in Korematsu which also appeared to justify the
deprivation of liberty also justified the deprivation of property. Congress' creation of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians in 1980 was the first indication by
a "political branch" of government that there may have been no military basis for the evacuation. The court held that this event triggered the running of the limitations period on the
internees' claims.
The court of appeals remanded to the district court to scrutinize independently the government's documents in evaluating the internees' taking claim. The Court deemed that Congress' 1980 decision to investigate the military reasons for evacuation and internment removed
the Korematsu Majority's "presumption of deference to military judgment." An alternative
principle justifying heightened judicial scrutiny on remand is suggested in section IV of this
article. That principle focuses on the consitutional rights involved and attempts to accommodate both the government's need todefend the nation and society's need to protect its most
precious liberties.
9. 323 U.S. at 244-45. For an excellent discussion, see Rostow, The Japanese American
Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 491 (1945) ("What the Supreme Court has done in
these cases, and especially in Korematsu v. United States, is to increase the strength of the
military in relation to civil government. It has upheld an act of military power without a
factual record in which the justification for the act was analyzed. Thus ithas created doubts as
to the standards of responsibility to which military power will held."); Dembitz, Racial Discriminationand MilitaryJudgment: the Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45
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and, although its factual underpinnings have been undercut by
Judge Patel's ruling, its legal legacy of diminished government accountability lingers.
This article will not attempt to fix historical responsibility.1
Nor will it directly examine the roles of the two overtly political
branches of government in crisis decisionmaking. It seeks instead to
draw upon the lessons learned from Korematsu. It examines important judicial policy considerations and constitutional values and synthesizes Korematsu and its contemporary progeny in order to advocate the adoption of a clear and simple principle of judicial review
for government restrictions of civil liberties for reasons of military
necessity or national security.
Specifically, Section II of this article examines the government's
apparent misconduct in prosecuting Korematsu and the Supreme
Court's deferential posture in contributing to the breakdown of constitutional safeguards to personal liberty.
Section III illustrates that the deferential standard of review actually applied in Korematsu has not been discarded. The Supreme
Court has yet to unambiguously determine whether heightened standards of review which are normally applied to evaluate government
restrictions of our most cherished liberties, 1 become attenuated when
COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945).

10. Others have undertaken that task. See, e.g., M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED
(1949); J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954); A. BOSWORTH, AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1967); B. HOSOKAWA,
NISEI: THE QUIET AMERICANS (1969); A GIRDNER & A. LoFis, THE GREAT BETRAYAL:
THE EVACUATION OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR 11 (1969); R. DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA: JAPANE.SE AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR 11 (1971); R.
DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE THE JAPANESE AMERICANS (1975); M. WEGLYN,
YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1976); F.
CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE AMERICANS (1976); REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED (1982) [hereinafter cited as CWRIC]; P. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).

(Professor Iron's book, in particular, discusses the meaning and origin of the documents supporting the Korematsu Petition).
11. Civil liberties accorded special constitutional protection are those specifically enumerated in the amendments to the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech, and those
denoted "fundamental rights." The last three or so decades have witnessed the development of
heightened standards of review concerning government restrictions of those liberties. See infra
notes 163-64 and accompanying text. These liberties are accorded heightened judicial solicitude
because by definition they are the liberties deemed most precious and integral to a functioning
democracy and to a decent society. Indeed, they are the very liberties national defense and
security measures are designed to protect. Concerning the continuing debate about the propriety of judicial identification of fundamental liberties not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, see Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976); J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981).
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"military necessity" or "national security" ostensibly justify the restrictions. The judiciary's record of "watchful care" over civil liberties during times of national stress has been punctuated with poignant exceptions such as Korematsu.12 Certain of the Court's recent
decisions even suggest a disturbing value judgment reminiscent of
Korematsu: national security concerns, overt or latent, specifically
defined or broadly general, justify essentially unreviewable government restrictions of American civil liberties.'
This apparent judicial value judgment, although not formally
cast as constitutional doctrine, has contributed to the prospect of considerable government excess under the mantle of national security."'
"National security" is an ill-defined concept with elastic limits. 5
Government definitions tend to be self-justifying.' Crisis government is no longer unusual as United States involvement in international hostilities increases and as developing despotic governments
12. See infra note 116.
13. See infra notes 125-61 and accompanying text. This apparent movement towards
governmental immunity in national defense and national security matters is consistent with the
Court's general approach to civil liberties. Professor Lawrence Tribe recently observed, "Until
this term, I thought the court was teetering in the middle of the road and could go either way.
.. now it has made a definite turn to the right. I am reminded of George Orwell's 1984 in the
way that the court has granted limitless government authority in some areas." San Jose Mercury News, July 8, 1984, at 8A, col. 1.
14. The court of appeals' decision in Hohri v. United States, No. 84-5460, slip op.
(D.C. Cir. 1986), underscores the tremendous danger in according the government essentially
unreviewable power under the mantle of military necessity. The court of appeals suggested
that because the Korematsu Majority applied an extremely deferential standard of review, the
Court might not have altered its decision even if the then concealed intelligence reports had
been disclosed. Hohri thus implies that unless heightened judicial scrutiny is required to protect precious civil liberties, the terrible "mistake" and social tragedy sanctioned by the Court in
Korematsu may again be sanctioned under our laws.
15. See infra note 132 concerning definitions of "national security." One commentator
has noted, "Presidents Truman through Reagan have adopted a foreign policy of global containment" which results in an almost boundless definition of national security interests. Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balances-The Claim of An Unlimited Presidential
War Power, 57 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 213, 215 (1983). Recently, "national security" has been
the stated justification for: a news blackout on the space shuttle launch carrying military
equipment, Honolulu Star Bulletin, Dec. 17, 1984, at A-17, cols. 1-4; and, the exclusion of
media coverage of the initial stages of the United States' 1983 invasion of Grenada (the Defense Department subsequently discussed a plan for limited future coverage of such events by a
government approved pool of reporters) San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 3, 1984, at 39, cols. 56.
16. See Note, Development in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1134 (1972) ("[P]articularly the political branches, characteristically have overestimated threats to national security to the detriment of civil liberties.").
Commentators have also noted the "increasingly restrictive policy of the Reagan administration
on the flow of military information to the public" for reasons of national security. Honolulu
Star Bulletin, Dec. 17, 1984, A17, cols. 1-4.
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cast threats at American security at home and abroad.17 These crises
and the apparent revival of Cold War tensions have generated, quite
appropriately, governmental concern about and reaction to threats to
national security. They have also, however, laid fertile ground for
government overreaction to unsubstantiated threats in the form of
far-reaching restrictions on the liberties of American civilians.' This
potential for overreaction arises at a time when the political
branches' system of checks and balances in the area of national se'17. See Miller, ConstitutionalLaw: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 OHIO
ST. L.J. 737 (1978): Forkosch, Speech and Press in National Emergencies, 18 GONZ. L. REV.
1 (1982/83).
18. See Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign
Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 719 (1982). Professor
Paust notes an apparent revival of the Nixonian contention that "so-called 'governmental [security] interests' can outweigh public interests and obviate democratic freedoms." Id. at 72021. See also Forkosch, supra note 17; Paust, InternationalLaw and Control of the Media:
Terror, Repression and the Alternatives, 53 IND. L.J. 621 (1978); F. DONNER, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

(1980). See also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) and Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026
(1984) (the government's contention of almost limitless presidential authority to restrict civil
liberties in order to further national security interests pursuant to the executive power over
foreign relations); Dronenburg v. Zeck, 746 F.2d 1579 (9th Cir. 1984) (navy regulations mandating discharge of homosexuals, with limited exceptions). See generally supra notes 11 and
12.
Such overreaction is not limited to the government. Immediately following the Iranian
hostage crisis, for example, there was a resounding backlash against not only Iranian aliens in
the United States but also against Iranian Americans. Reports of xenophobic outbursts were
numerous. Violence and threats of violence abounded. Iranian residents were fired from their
jobs or placed on leave. A community college in South Carolina decided (and later changed its
mind) to expel all Iranian students. Congressmen reportedly called for the deportation of Iranian students participating in demonstrations against the former Shah of Iran. See NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19, 1979, at 73, col. 2; TIME, Nov. 26, 1979, at 20, col. 1; NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3,

1979, at 65, col. 2; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 10, 1979, col. 1. While implementing
a dragnet of all Iranian students in the United States to weed out illegal immigrants, government officials cautioned against such overreaction: "We all must restrain our actions and behave with a considered regard for our rule of law." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 10,
1979, at 35, col. 2 (quoting Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti).
Judges are also susceptible. In Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (upholding the attorney general's hostage crisis regulation requiring
that non-immigrant alien Iranian students report and prove their immigration status), Justice
McKinnon's concurring opinion tended to equate alienage and ethnicity with disloyalty and
implied that the restrictive treatment of uninvolved Iranian aliens in America was justified as a
retaliatory measure - by "the fact that the Government of their home country has committed,
and is committing, a number of violent and lawless acts against the United States." 617 F.2d
at 749. Such views were perhaps more reflective of public sentiment than judicial
temperament.
As noted aptly in Note, Narenji v. Civiletti: Equal Protection and the Iranian Crisis, 31
CATH. U.L. REV. 101 (1981), "[plerhaps the most disturbing implication of the Narenji decision is the court's failure to remember the lesson of the Japanese Restriction Cases ....
[N]ational origin is a characteristic readily seized upon in the heat of national crises for the
creation of political scapegoats." Id. at 120.
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curity and military affairs is showing definite signs of strain.' 9
Section IV proposes a principle of judicial review which responds to the problem of ambiguous, if not unduly lax, standards of
government accountability which exist at a time when clarity and
balance are critical. If a constitutional democracy is to function, its
constitution must be construed both to afford the government ample
latitude in dealing with a wide range of threats to the nation and to
still protect the most precious liberties of its citizens from government excesses during times of crisis. Encompassing both concerns is
the following organizing principle: except when martial law is legitimately in force, the standard of judicial review of government restrictions of civil liberties is not altered or attenuated by government
claims of "military necessity" or "national security" as justification
for the restrictions. Standards of constitutional review20 are important because they identify and order societal values. They reflect the
relative importance society attaches to the various liberties of its people. The more valued the liberty, the less acceptable the government
infringement, and the more exacting the standard of judicial review.
As discussed later, the proposed principle applies with special force
in the context of government control over civilians for reasons of military necessity or national security.
What are the standards of government accountability for military or national security actions inimical to the civil liberties of
Americans? What is the role of the judiciary when the executive and
legislative branches are inundated by the ephemeral emotions of.
their political constituencies? What value choices are made to accom19. In 1973, as a result of a perceived shift in war powers away from Congress and
towards the President, Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution, PUB. L. No. 93-148, 87
Stat. 555, (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973)). The primary purpose of the Resolution
was to check Presidential commitments of armed forces to international hostilities without congressional consultation or approval.
In deciding to invade Grenada in October of 1983 and to deploy marines in Lebanon in
March of 1984, President Reagan adopted a position that neither prior congressional consultation nor approval were required. For a discussion of the conflicting positions of the President
and members of Congress about the effect of the Resolution on those decisions, see Comment,
The Case of Korematsu v. United States, 6 U. HAWAII L. REV 109, 132 (1984). See also
Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (executive branch's position that it did not need to
receive congressional approval or declare a state of emergency to prohibit American economic
transactions in Cuba, as expressly required by Congress' 1976 amendments to the Trading
with the Enemy Act, because a 1962 declaration of emergency during the Cuban missile crisis
was sufficient to validate the executive's action in 1982).
20. "Standards of review" is a phrase with two generally accepted meanings. It refers to
the level of deference accorded by an appellate court to a lower court's determinations. It also
refers to the standards by which a court evaluates the consitutionality of executive and legislative branch actions. The latter meaning is used here.
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modate national security concerns and civil liberties when a court,
faced with a "suspect" government classification, adopts a deferential
as opposed to a heightened standard of review in evaluating the government's contention of military necessity? These vital issues faced
the Korematsu Court in 1944. They are alive today.
II.

THE KOREMATSU AND HIRABAYASHI CASES: EXTRAORDI-

NARY GOVERNMENT EXCESS AND LAX JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Supreme Court decided three cases which challenged the
constitutionality of the World War II military orders. In Hirabayashi v. United States 1 and Yasui v. United States22 the Court upheld military orders which imposed a curfew upon German and Italian aliens and upon all persons of Japanese ancestry, including
American citizens, on the West Coast. In Korematsu v. United
States,23 the Court upheld the military's Japanese evacuation or-

ders.

4

The government asserted in these cases that the danger of

21. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In 1983, Gordon Hirabayashi, like Fred Korematsu, filed a
Coram Nobis Petition to vacate his conviction. The federal district court for the Western District of Washington recently granted the Petition on the merits, finding that War Department
deliberately misled the Supreme Court about the basis and rationale for military orders. Hirabayashi v. United States, memorandum decision (Feb. 10, 1986). Trial on the Petition followed in June of 1985. A decision is expected around the time of publication of this article.
22. 320 U.S. 115 (1943). Minoru Yasui also a filed Coram Nobis Petition to vacate his
conviction. The Federal District Court in Portland, unlike the courts in San Francisco and
Seattle, granted the government's nolle prosequi Rule 48(a) motion to vacate Yasui's conviction
and therefore dismissed Yasui's petition as unnecessary. The Yasui case was appealed and in
October of 1985 the Ninth Circuit remanded to the District Court for a determination of
whether the appeal was timely filed. No. 84-3730, slip op. (9th Cir. 1985).
23. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24. The following is a brief history of pertinent government actions. On February 14,
1942, General John DeWitt, military commander of the Western Defense Command, submitted his Final Recommendation to the Secretary of War. He recommended the mass evacuation
of all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated areas on the West Coast because such
persons were "potential enemies" organized for concerted activity.
On February 19, 1944, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9066 which authorized the Secretary of War and designated military commanders to prescribe military areas
and to exclude or restrict the activities of persons in these areas to prevent espionage and
sabotage. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81, 84-86.
On March 2, 1942, DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. I which established military
areas on the West Coast and which warned that exclusion orders might follow. Id. at 86. On
March 21, 1942, Congress enacted PUB. L. No. 503 which made it a misdemeanor for anyone
to "enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act" in a military area in violation of the orders of
the military commanders of the area. Id. at 87-88. Neither the Executive Order nor the Congressional enactment referred to internment or provided definite standards for actions by the
military.
On March 24, 1942, DeWitt promulgated Public Proclamation No. 3, which imposed a
curfew on "all alien Germans, all alien Italians and all persons of Japanese ancestry" (emphasis added). DeWitt asserted military necessity as the basis for the curfew. Id. at 88.
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espionage and sabotage by persons of Japanese ancestry on the West
Coast justified these extraordinary actions. Specifically, the government claimed that all Japanese, including American citizens, were,
by culture and race, predisposed to loyalty to Japan and to disloyalty
to the United States; that Japanese on the West Coast had committed and were likely to commit acts of espionage and sabotage against
the United States; and that mass action was needed because there
was insufficient time to determine disloyalty individually. No evidence of record supported these conclusions.2"
The Korematsu Court implied that it was impelled to accept
these government conclusions in the absence of contradicting evidence-"[H]ere, as in Hirabayashi . . . 'we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment'. .".26The information critical to supporting
or discrediting the military's claim of necessity, however, lay exclusively in the hands of the government.
By applying a deferential standard of review to the information
proffered by the government, the Hirabayashiand Korematsu Court
in essence validated the curfew and evacuation on faith. As found by
Judge Patel in her recent decision, that faith was badly misplaced.
A.

Governmental Misrepresentationand Concealment of Evidence

The following is a brief summary of the most significant government documents from the Supreme Court in 1943-44. The documents on their face appear to contradict directly the government's
legal position concerning military necessity. Judge Patel referred to
these documents as a basis for her recent decision."' They are also
cited and discussed in the opinions of the appellate and district courts
Commencing on March 23, 1942, DeWitt issued a series of 108 Civilian Exclusion Orders pursuant to which over 110,000 Japanese were uprooted from their homes, sent to assembly centers and ultimately to internment camps - all without charges made against them or
individual review as to their loyalty. Neither Japanese Americans in Hawaii nor citizens of
German or Italian descent in any part of the country were subject to mass evacuation or
detention. For a detailed discussion of the influence of West Coast politicians, agricultural
organizations, anti-Asian groups and the press on these government actions, See CWRIC,
supra note 10, and J. TENBROEK, supra note 10.
25. See infra section A.
26. Korensatsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
27. 584 F. Supp. at 1407. For a thorough discussion see Korematsu Petition for Writ of
Error Coram Nobis, including Exhibits A through FF attached thereto, filed with the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, January 19, 1983 (No. CR-2763W)
[hereinafter cited as Petition] (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review office). The discussion of
documents here is in principal part based upon sections of the Petition. See also P. IRONS,
supra note 10; CWRIC, supra note 10.
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in Hohri v. United States.23 The government did not contest the authenticity of these documents in either case. 29 Their existence and
contents, and the knowledge of them by the highest officials in the
War and Justice Departments speak eloquently about the inherent
dangers in weakening the principle of government accountability
when fundamental liberties are restricted.
1. DeWitt's Final Report
The only information presented to the Korematsu Court concerning military necessity was information not included in the official record on appeal. The information was presented in Commander DeWitt's unverified Final Report was dated June 5, 1943
but it was not officially submitted to the Justice Department until
January of 1944. The Final Report was transmitted to the Court
along with the government's Korernatsu brief;30 it was not a part of
the evidentiary record considered by the lower courts.
DeWitt had prepared the report to explain the military's justification for the curfew and evacuation. Ten copies of the report in
final form were printed, bound and transmitted to the War Department on April 15, 1943 for use in the preparation of the government's Hirabayashi brief.3" The report contained an astonishing
statement about the military's rationale for the evacuation: due to
racial characteristics it was impossible to distinguish loyal Japanese
Americans from disloyal Japanese Americans and therefore it did
not matter whether there was adequate time to determine disloyalty
individually.
It was impossible to establish the identity of the loyal and the
disloyal with any degree of safety. It was not that there was
insufficient time in which to make such a determination; it was
simply a matter of facing the realities that a positive determination could not be made, that an exact separation of the "sheep
from the goats" was unfeasible. a2
28. No. 84-5460, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1986); 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.C. 1984). See supra
notes 8 and 14.
29. The danger of unfairness exists whenever past events and actions are recreated and
reassessed. However, that danger is mitigated here because the past government action is being
assessed based upon the government's official working documents that describe contemporaneous events.
30. Final Report, Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast, 1942, reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit D.
31. Letter from DeWitt to Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, April 15, 1943,
reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit C.
32. Petition, supra note 27, Final Report at 9. Although it is possible to construe this
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DeWitt's statement revealed the racial stigmatization underlying the
evacuation and also contradicted the position the War Department
planned to present to the Court-that a primary military consideration was the insufficiency of time to deal with the disloyal
individually.
After a heated and lengthy debate between DeWitt and Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, the statement in the report was
changed to read: "To complicate the situation, no ready means existed for determining the loyal and disloyal with any degree of
safety."' This alteration concealed DeWitt's belief that racial characteristics predisposed all Japanese to disloyalty. It also concealed
DeWitt's statement that time was not a factor in the evacuation decision. Most important, it shifted the justification for the evacuation
from unsupportable racial myths to logistical practicalities. Following the alteration, the War Department and the military attempted
to destroy all evidence of the original report. 4
The alteration of DeWitt's report may have significantly affected the Court's decisions. The government's brief in Hirabayashi
cited insufficient time for individual loyalty investigations and hearings." Accepting this argument, the Hirabayashi Court upheld the
curfew orders because DeWitt had determined that the Japanese
American population included "disloyal members [who] . ..could

not readily be isolated and separately dealt with" by other means.3 0
statement as an admission that there was sufficient time to determine disloyalty on an individual basis, the context of the statement and its use of a double negative indicate that DeWitt
meant to say that time to determine disloyalty was not a major factor in his decision. See P.
IRONS, supra note 10, at 208.
33. Petition, supra note 27, Final Report at 9; see P. IRONs, supra note 10, at 206-11,
for an excellent discussion of the circumstances surrounding the alteration of the Final Report.
34. DeWitt ordered destruction of all copies of the report. "Take action to call in all
copies previously sent to WD less enclosures and to have WD destroy all records of receipt of
report as when final revision is forwarded letter of transmittal will be redated." Telegram,
Colonel Bendetsen to General Barnet, May 9, 1943, reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at
Exhibit H. On June 7, 1943, the War Department responded, "War Department records have
been adjusted accordingly." Letter, Captain Hall to Colonel Bendetsen, June 7, 1943, reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit J. The destruction of records was completed on
June 29, 1944. "I certify that this date I witnessed the destruction by burning of the galley
proofs, galley pages, drafts and memorandums of the original report of the Japanese Evacuation." Memorandum, Warrant Officer Junior Grade Theodore E. Smith, June 29, 1943, reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit K.
It is noteworthy that the Justice Department, in opposing Gordon Hirabayashi's Coram
Nobis Petition, characterized the original DeWitt Report as a "draft." Government's Proposed
Prehearing Order, at 15 and 21 (hearing on March 22, 1985), Hirabayashi v. United States,
No. C83-122V, United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.
35. Brief for United States, at 62-65, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81.
36. 320 U.S. at 99.
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The Korematsu opinion quoted this passage from Hirabayashi in
justifying the evacuation as well.3 However, the government did not
proffer any evidence of "insufficiency of time," and the military's
actual rationale for the evacuation lay hidden behind the government's untested contention.
2.

The ONI, FBI, and FCC Intelligence Reports

The government also failed to disclose to the Court reports by
the American intelligence services which investigated the potential
disloyalty of West Coast Japanese. These reports directly contradicted key statements in General DeWitt's Final Report concerning
espionage and sabotage and also contradicted the contention that
Japanese Americans as a group posed a danger to military security.
None of the intelligence services recommended mass evacuation.
The DeWitt Final Report which was presented to the Court
contained examples of two specific incidents of espionage and sabotage on the West Coast. First, the report stated that the military
intercepted unauthorized radio signals and implied that these illicit
signals were connected with Japanese submarine attacks on American ships. "This seemed conclusively to point to the existence of hostile shore-to-ship (submarine) communication." 9 Second, the report
stated that "there were hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights
visible from the coast .

.

. signalling was often observed at premises

which could not be entered without a warrant because of mixed [i.e.,
alien and citizen] occupancy. '"40
These two statements comprised the entire case presented by
DeWitt concerning "actual" acts of espionage and sabotage by Japanese Americans. 1 Neither the Final Report itself, nor the govern37. 323 U.S. at 218.
38. That time was not a major factor is supported by the relatively slow pace at which
the evacuation proceeded. The evacuation did not commence until four months after Pearl
Harbor, and it took almost five months to complete. Justice Murphy, in his dissent in Korematsu, noted "[I]t seems incredible that under these circumstances it would have been impossible to hold loyalty hearings for the mere 112,000 persons involved-or at least the 70,000
American citizens-especially when a large part of this number represented children and elderly men and women," and cited the experience of the British government in providing loyalty
hearings to 74,000 German and Austrian aliens in the six months following the commencement of the war. 323 U.S. at 241-42; see Dembitz, supra note 9, at 190.
39. Petition, supra note 27, Final Report at 4.
40. Id. at 8; Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. at 777.
41. In the Korematsu prosecution and appeal in 1944 and in the coram nobis proceeding in 1983, the government did not refer to the "Magic" cables as evidence of military necessity. The "Magic" cables are an eight volume publication. DEP'T OF DEFENSE THE "MAGIC"
BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR (1977). Those volumes contain Japanese diplomatic (as
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ment in presenting it to the Court, however, acknowledged the contradictory findings of other civil and military intelligence services.4 2
The Office of Naval Intelligence ("ONI") 4" had commenced an
extensive investigation of potential danger posed by Japanese Americans well before Pearl Harbor. In its January 26, 1942 Report, the
ONI concluded that Japanese Americans posed little danger to military security-that potentially disloyal Japanese aliens and American citizens were "estimated to be less than 3,500 .

.

. in the entire

United States," and that most of those persons "are either already in
custodial detention or are members of ...
known" to the ONI or FBI."

groups already fairly well

distinguished from military) cables sent in 1941 and then deciphered by American intelligence.
"A small number of the cables concern Japanese intelligence efforts in the United States" to
recruit Japanese Americans. CWRIC, supra note 10, at Addendum to Report at 1. The
CWRIC Report analyzed those cables and concluded that the recruitment effort failed.
"[Tihere is no indication in the Magic cables of a sabotage or fifth column organization. The
likelihood of sabotage and fifth column aid in case of attack were, of course, major arguments
advanced in support of the exclusion." Id. at 1-2, 4 (footnotes omitted).
For an excellent analysis of the "Magic" cables which is supportive of the CWRIC's
findings, see Herzig, Japanese Americans and Magic, 11 AMERASIA J. 47 (1984). The
CWRIC addendum reflected the view of eight of the nine commissioners. Commissioner Lungren filed a supplemental addendum in which he stated that the commission may have too
easily dismissed the possibility that the "Magic" cables effected the decision to undertake mass
evacuation. CWRIC, supra note 10, at Addendum.
In the Hirabayashi Coram Nobis proceeding, the court implicitly rejected the Justice
Department's contention that the "Magic" cables showed the Japanese government's belief
that "it had succeeded in establishing an espionage network which included Japanese Americans and aliens." See supra note 34.
42. In granting Korematsu's Petition, Judge Patel found: "Omitted from the report
presented to the courts was information possessed by the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Navy, and the Justice Department which directly contradicted General DeWitt's statements." 584 F. Supp. at 1419. In ruling from the bench on November 10,
1983, Judge Patel stated:
These records show the facts upon which the military necessity justification for
the executive order ... the legislative act ... and the exclusion orders ... were
based upon and relied upon by the government in its arguments to the Court
and to the Supreme Court, on unsubstantiated facts, distortions and representations of at least one military commander whose views were seriously infected by
racism."
Transcript of Hearing at 37, Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
43. The Office of Naval Intelligence ("ONI") was assigned primary responsibility for
gathering and disseminating intelligence about West Coast Japanese Americans. The FBI was
assigned control over "actual or strongly presumptive cases of espionage or sabotage." The
Military Intelligence Division ("MID") of the Army coordinated intelligence efforts with the
ONI and FBI. See Petition supra note 27, at Exhibit M 66-69.
44. Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit N, Lieutenant Commander K.D. Ringle, "Report on Japanese Question," January 26, 1942. Ringle had spent much time doing intelligence
work in both Japan and southern California where he had assisted in breaking a major Japanese spy ring through a surreptitious entry. He had also developed an effective system of Nisei
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The report concluded:
[1In short, the entire "Japanese Problem" has been magnified
out of its true proportion, largely because of the physical characteristics of the people; that it is no more serious than the
problems of the German, Italian and communistic portions of
the United States population, and, finally that it should be handled on the basis of the individual regardless of citizenship, and
45
not on a racial basis.

The report prepared by the intelligence service responsible for investigating West Coast Japanese thus directly contradicted the government's legal position in Korematsu in three critical respects. It found
that the potentially disloyal were small in number and were generally identifiable and that the situation for Japanese was no different
handling
than the Germans and Italians. The report recommended
41
basis.
nonracial
individual,
an
on
potential disloyalty
The FBI also concluded that "the necessity for mass evacuation
is based primarily upon public and political pressure rather than on
factual data."' 47 These findings were echoed by Attorney General
informants which he shared with the FBI. CWRIC, supra note 10, at 53. At the request of
the War Relocation Authority, Ringle prepared and expanded a 57-page report entitled "The
Japanese Question in the United States" dated June 15, 1942.
The Justice Department in opposing Hirabayashi's Coram Nobis Petition, took the position that Ringle's report was an "expression of his individual opinion" rather than an "authoritative factual report which conclusively refuted every rational basis for an 8:00 p.m. to 6:00
a.m. curfew." See supra note 29, at 14. But in Hohri v. United States No. 84-5460, slip op.
(D.C. Cir. 1986), the court of appeals reviewed historical documents and noted:
Ennis [director of the Justice Department's Alien Enemy Control Unit] knew
that Ringle's views would not be dismissed as those of a solitary dissident, for
Ennis had been informed that Ringle's views were shared by his superiors at
Naval Intelligence .... Ennis also knew that the Army and Navy had agreed
that Naval Intelligence would assume responsibility for the Japanese issue.
Id. (citations omitted).
45. Report on Japanese Question, supra note 44, at 3; see Hohri v. United States, 586
F. Supp. at 778.
46. The report, which was available to DeWitt pursuant to the Delimitation Agreement, was brought to the attention of both Attorney General Francis Biddle and Assistant
Secretary of War John McCloy before the curfew and evacuation orders. Letter from Biddle to
McCloy, March 9, 1942, reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit 0. Letter from
McCloy to Biddle, March 21, 1942 ("I was greatly impressed with Commander Ringle's
knowledge of the Japanese problem along the coast."), reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at
Exhibit P.
47. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Biddle, February 2, 1942, reprinted in
CWRIC, supra note 10, at 73. In March of 1941, the FBI, working with the ONI, surreptitiously entered the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles and seized a list of Japanese sympathizers and espionage agents. The arrests that followed "effectively dismantled a Japanese espionage network" nine months before Pearl Harbor. IRONS, supra note 10, at 22; Memorandum
from Special Agent in Charge N.J.L. Pieper to Hoover, November 8, 1941, reprinted in
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Biddle in his dissent against the proposed evacuation in a memorandum to President Roosevelt two days before the issuance of the executive order.48 Furthermore, in February, 1944, while the Justice Department was preparing its Korematsu brief, FBI director Hoover
directly refuted the general statements in DeWitt's Final Report
concerning espionage allegedly connected with Japanese submarine
attacks and shore-to-ship signalling.4 9 Hoover repeated the FBI's
findings to Biddle:
Every complaint in this regard [shore to ship signalling] has
been investigated, but in no case has any information been obtained which would substantiate the allegations that there has
been illicit signalling from shore-to-ship since the beginning of
the war. 50
Federal Communications Commission Commissioner James Fly confirmed Hoover's conclusions to Biddle."1
Petition, supra note 27, at Appendix.
In addition, immediately following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States Attorney General's office, authorized by the President, detained over 2,300 aliens (including 1,291
Japanese) who were deemed a potential threat to national security. Petition, supra note 27,
Final Report at 3. The detention was undertaken pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 21 (1976), which authorized the President during war or threatened hostilities to apprehend,
restrain, secure and remove aliens of hostile countries.
48. "For several weeks there have been increasing demands for evacuation of all Japanese, aliens and citizens alike, from the West Coast states ....
[Vlarious special interests
would welcome their removal from good farm land and the elimination of their competition..
. . Walter Lippman [sic] and Westbrook Pegler recently have taken up the evacuation cry on
the ground that attack on the West Coast and widespread sabotage is imminent. My last
advice from the War Department is that there is no evidence of imminent attack and from the
FBI that there is no evidence of planned sabotage." Memorandum from Biddle to President
Roosevelt, February 17, 1942, reprinted in CWRIC, supra note 10, at 83.
49. Even the intelligence reports of the Army MID submitted to DeWitt prior to the
evacuation indicated that enemy intelligence about the West Coast had not been gleaned
through West Coast "fifth column" activity. The MID's five weekly reports, dated January 3
through January 31, 1942, stated that enemy intelligence about West Coast operations had
been obtained through "information learned during peace and by the activities of fifth columnists." G-2 Periodic Report No. 3, January 31, 1942, reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at
Exhibit R. Commencing on February 7, 1942, and continuing through the onset of the evacuation, the MID's revised weekly reports completely eliminated citation of fifth column activity
as a source of enemy intelligence. G-2 Periodic Report No. 20, May 16, 1942, reprinted in
Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit R.
50. Memorandum from Hoover to Biddle, February 7, 1944, reprinted in Petition,
supra note 27, at Exhibit W. See Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. at 779.
51. Fly reported to Attorney General Biddle that "the Commission knows of no cvidence of any illicit signalling in this area during the period in question." Memorandum from
Fly to Biddle, April 4, 1944 (see Petition supra note 27, at Exhibit V). See also Hohr, 586 F.
Supp. at 778.
The FCC's radio intelligence division was responsible for monitoring all radio communications. It maintained constant surveillance with sophisticated equipment. In specifically refut-
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3. The Suppression of Evidence
The government in its presentation to the Court in 1944 failed
to acknowledge or even to mention the findings and conclusions of
the ONI, FBI, FCC, and MID concerning the identifiability of the
small number of potentially disloyal, the recommendation to handle
disloyalty on an individual basis, the absence of a single verified act
of espionage or sabotage, or the absence of significant "fifth column"
intelligence gathering. The government, over vehement objections by
the Justice Department personnel responsible for drafting the government's brief, maintained just the opposite. Attempts by Justice
Department attorneys to alert the Court to the falsity of the DeWitt
report were thwarted.
On April 30, 1943, Edward Ennis, the Director of the Alien
Enemy Control Unit of the Justice Department and the official responsible for preparation of the Hirabayashi brief, informed Solicitor General Fahy of his knowledge of the ONI report and its impact
on the government's legal position. Ennis stated, among other things:
"[T]he Government is forced to argue that individual, selective evacuation would have been impractical and insufficient when we have
positive knowledge that the only Intelligence agency responsible for
advising General DeWitt gave him advice directly to the contrary. ' 82
Concerning disclosure of the ONI report to the Court, Ennis advised, "Any other course might approximate the suppression of
5'
evidence. 8
Despite awareness of the ONI report by the Attorney General,
the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Solicitor General, and despite Ennis' warning concerning non-disclosure, neither DeWitt's
Final Report nor the government briefs in Hirabayashi, Yasui, or
Korematsu referred to the ONI report or its contents. The briefs
presented to the Court also failed to refer to the FCC or FBI reports, both of which specifically refuted the DeWitt report and noted
the complete absence of actual or anticipated acts of espionage or
sabotage by West Coast Japanese.
ing the Final Report concerning illicit shore-to-ship signalling by radio, Fly wrote to Biddle:
"There were no radio signals reported to the Commission which could not be identified, or
which were unlawful." Memorandum from Fly to Biddle, April 4, 1944, reprinted in Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit V. Even the intelligence reports of the Army MID submitted to
DeWitt prior to the evacuation indicated that enemy intelligence about the West Coast had not
been gleaned through West Coast "fifth column activity." Id. at Exhibits R and S.
52. Memorandum from Ennis to Solicitor General Fahy, April 30, 1943, reprinted in
Petition, supra note 27, at Exhibit Q.
53. Id. See Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. at 779.
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In preparing the government's Korematsu brief, Ennis and his
assistant, John Burling, attempted to alert the Court to the existence
of the FBI and FCC reports. Burling inserted a footnote into the
brief to advise the Court that the Justice Department possessed information refuting the government's claims of alleged espionage. The
footnote read:
The [Final Report's] recital of the circumstances justifying the
evacuation as a matter of military necessity, however, is in several respects, particularly with reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and to shore-to-ship signalling by persons of
Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information in possession of
the Department of Justice. In view of the contrariety of the reports on this matter, we do not ask the Court to take judicial
notice of the recitals of those facts contained in the Report. 4
Burling urged the Justice Department to resist War Department efforts to change the footnote, and he explained the footnote's rationale
to Assistant Attorney General Wechsler.
You will recall that General DeWitt's report makes flat statements concerning radio transmitters and ship-to-shore signalling
which are categorically denied by the FBI and the Federal
Communications Commission. There is no doubt that these
statements are intentional falsehoods . . . [Ilt seems to me that
the present bowdlerization of the footnote is unfortunate. There
is in fact a contrariety of information and we ought to say so.35
In his unsuccessful defense of the Burling footnote, Ennis wrote
to the Assistant Attorney General "strongly recommending that the
footnote be kept in its existing form," citing and attaching the FBI
and FCC reports "illustrating the falsity of the DeWitt report.""
He also cited the Justice Department's ethical duty not to misuse the
54. Memorandum from Burling to Wechsler, Sept. 11, 1944, reprinted in Petition,
supra note 27, at Exhibit AA. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. at 1417; Hohri v.
United States, 586 F. Supp. at 780.
55. Memorandum from Burling to Wechsler, Sept. 11, 1944, reprinted in Petition,
supra note 27, at Exhibit AA. Burling also defended the footnote to Solicitor General Fahy:
We are now therefore in possession of substantially incontrovertible evidence
that the most important statements of fact advanced by General DeWitt to justify the evacuation and detention were incorrect, and furthermore that General
DeWitt had cause to know, and in all probability did know, that they were
incorrect at the time he embodied them in his final report to General Marshall.
Memorandum from Burling to Fahy, April 13, 1944, reprinted in P. IRoNS, supra note 10, at
285.
56. Memorandum from Ennis to Wechsler, September 30, 1944, reprinted in Petition,
supra note 27, at Exhibit B and Addendum A to Judge Patel's opinion.
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doctrine of judicial notice and noted the unfairness of the govern57
ment's position toward Japanese Americans.
The War Department intervened, however, and ultimately convinced the Justice Department to alter substantially the Burling footnote to eliminate reference to the government's knowledge of any
contradictory information. 8 The revised footnote asked the Court to
take judicial notice of the facts recited in the government's brief and
of the Final Report as it related to those facts.59
The government's statements on oral argument seemed to reflect
both a serious attempt to stay within the bounds of the revised footnote and a conflicting recognition that "facts" in the Final Report
not subject to judicial notice might be essential to proving military
necessity. 60 The government's formal position was that the Court
could only take judicial notice of "facts" in the Final Report which
were of "public general knowledge" 1 and that the facts subject to
judicial notice were sufficient to sustain the validity of the military
orders.6" The government also stated, however:
57. This Department has an ethical obligation to the Court to refrain from citing
it [the Final Report] as a source of which the court may properly take judicial
notice if the Department knows that important statements in the source are
untrue and if it knows as to other statements that there is such contrariety of
information that judicial notice is improper ....The general tenor of the report
is not only that there is a reason to be apprehensive, but also to the effect that
overt acts of treason were being committed. Since this is not so it is highly
unfair to this racial minority that these lies, put out in an official publication, go
uncorrected. This is the only opportunity which this Department has to correct
them.
Id.
58. The revised footnote included in the government's Korematsu brief read: "We have
specifically recited in this brief the facts relating to the justification for the evacuation, of which
we ask the Court to take judicial notice; and we rely upon the Final Report only to the extent
that it relates to such facts." Brief for the United States at 21-22, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). See P. IRONS, supra note 10, at 288-92 (regarding the War Department's campaign to alter the Burling footnote).
59. See supra note 58.
60. Transcript of Hearing before Supreme Court, October 12, 1944, at 8 and 10, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214.
61. Id. For example, Justice Jackson asked about the Court's obligations concerning judicial notice because "in certain instances in which the report is silent as to dates, it is pointed
out that the occurrences stated in the report were after the Japanese had all been evacuated."
The government responded generally that the Court could not
rely upon the facts other than those which are matters of common knowledge or
which come from sources which the Court can take judicial notice, and from
which such facts can be made available to the Court. If it should become important, we would make every effort to do that.
Id. at 9.
62. Id. at 10.
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Beyond that [facts of "public general knowledge"], as to the details in the report, certainly the Court is entitled, it seems to
me, to consider them in proving what the general was thinking,
his motive and what he had before him when he made the judgment which he made. Otherwise, I see nothing to be done...
except that the case go back to be heard, and that all this be
gone into at trial, which the Government does not suggest. 63

This statement, which was made during oral argument, reflected the
government's apparent position that the Court could and indeed
should take notice of "facts" in the Final Report as proof of "what
the general . . .had before him," even if those facts were not of
"public general knowledge," to preclude the need for a remand for

fact-finding. 6 '
Judge Patel's decision granting Korematsu's Petition was based
upon the manifest injustice to Korematsu resulting from the government's presentation of false and misleading information to the Court
and in "knowingly with[holding] information from the courts when
65
they were considering the critical question of military necessity."
The district court deemed the "record ... [so] replete with protesta-

tions of various Justice Department officials that the government had
the obligation to advise the courts of the contrary facts and opinions." 66 Similarly, the court of appeals in Hohri noted that the government's documents "suggest the Justice Department [in Hirabayashi] misled the Supreme Court when it argued that military
necessity justified the mass evacuation. "67
63. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. 584 F. Supp. at 1417. The Ennis and Burling memoranda, pertaining to the deliberate suppression of significant information and the intentional concealment of such information from the Court, were first disclosed publicly pursuant to Professor Irons' Freedom of
Information Act request in 1982. These documents provided the specific intent element to
Korematsu's claim of prosecutorial misconduct and formed a critical part of the Petition to
vacate his conviction. See Petition, supra note 27, at 62-70. Judge Patel, in granting the Petition, explained the significance of the documents in relation to the Coram Nobis petition. "It
appears from the record that much of the evidence upon which petitioner bases his motion was
not discovered until recently. In fact, until the discovery of the documents relating to the government's brief before the Supreme Court, there was no specific evidence of governmental
misconduct availitble." 584 F. Supp. at 1419. But see Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. at
790 ("But there has long been sufficient circumstantial evidence of the concealment ....").
66. 584 F. Supp. at 1418. Judge Patel's decision did not encompass the government's
arguments and representations in oral argument before the Supreme Court. The hearing transcript apparently was only recently located and no court has interpreted it or specifically ruled
upon the effect of the government's statements to the Court.
67. Hohri v. United States, No. 84-5460, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Standard of Review

Considering the amount of information concealed by the government and the paucity of information actually provided, the standard of review adopted by the Supreme Court to evaluate the government's claims of military necessity was probably the most critical
aspect of the Court's decisions.
When the cases reached the Court-Hirabayashiand Yasui in
April, 1943 and Korematsu in May, 1944-the threat of invasion of
the West Coast had passed. The Court had to decide in this setting,
with over 100,000 Japanese still interned, whether to accept without
close factual scrutiny the military's assertion of "necessity" as the
justification for the curfew and mass evacuation, or whether to require that the government establish a credible factual basis for its
extraordinary actions."
In various parts of its opinions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu
the Court used language alluding to a demanding standard of review. The Hirabayashiopinion noted that "distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious
to a free people." 6 9 The Korematsu opinion stated at its outset that
"all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect" and that "courts must subject [such
restrictions] to the most rigid scrutiny.""0 The opinion also declared
that "[n]othing short of apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety" can justify
such restrictions.71 Several courts and commentators have seized
upon this language and cited Hirabayashi and Korematsu as cases
which have applied the strict scrutiny standard of review in upholding invidious racial classifications on the grounds of "pressing public
necessity."

'7

1

Whether or not the Court intended to articulate for the first
time a heightened standard of review of invidious racial classifica68. Rostow, supra note 9, at 502-03, See CWRIC, supra note 10, at 12-16, 220-21.
69. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. at 100.
70. Id. at 216.
71. Id. at 218.
72. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Graney, Rostker v. Goldberg,
Equal Protection and War Powers, 15 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 725, 731 (1982) (strict

scrutiny applied to statute relocating Japanese during World War II); Note, supra note 16, at
1296 (After subjecting the measure to "rigid scrutiny," the court upheld the exclusion as necessary for the protection of the country in time of war). See generally Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 128 (1958) (citing Korematsu as a case involving the exercise of war power upon a
showing of the "gravest imminent danger to the public safety.").
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tions, it did not actually subject the government's racial classification
to "strict scrutiny."' 73 In both the Hirabayashiand Korematsu decisions, the Court adopted without factual scrutiny the military's unsubstantiated assertion of necessity.74 Political expediency during
war is one explanation advanced for the Court's approach to these
momentous government actions.7' Another and somewhat complementary explanation, with doctrinal underpinnings, may be found in
a close reading of the Court's language and case citations. The Court
may in part have labeled racial classifications "suspect" to reaffirm
the general principle that such classifications are prohibited if they
are based directly upon racial animus. 7 ' The Court then declined to
apply the principle by distinguishing77 Korematsu and Hirabayashi
from situations of racial antagonism
73. The strict scrutiny standard of review had not been clearly articulated or accorded a
place in American jurisprudence when these cases were decided. The Court had not adopted
Chief Justice Stone's formulation in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1937), concerning strict scrutiny of "suspect" classifications. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964) (first articulating the compelling state interest and least restrictive means
formulation of the strict scrutiny standard). Professor Irons suggests that the "immediately
suspect" and "rigid scrutiny" language of the Korematsu opinion may have been added by
Justice Black in the final draft of the opinion to placate the dissenters. P. IRONS, supra note
10, at 339.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 79-100. In view of the deference accorded the
government's claim of military necessity, it is clear that the Court did not mean that all restrictive racial classifications, as a matter of constitutional principle, were to be subjected to "the
most rigid scrutiny." The Korematsu Majority opinion's focus on the "apprehension [of the
danger] by the proper military authorities" suggests a subjective approach which turns not on
the existence of objective information available to the government, but on the military commander's actual state of mind. See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
75. See infra text accompanying note 110.
76. "Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such [racial] restrictions; racial antagonism never can." 323 U.S. at 216. This language appeared to be generally consistent with an earlier line of cases which invalidated government racial classifications
motivated by racial prejudice. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Yu Cong - Eng
v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926): Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942), cited in Hirabayashi,
320 U.S. at 83. See also infra note 83. Compare Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (U.S.
1857) (black slaves have no right to citizenship, and temporary residence in a free state does
not remove the bonds of slavery), decided prior to the passage of the fourteenth amendment.
77. The Majority failed to scrutinize the factual basis of its conclusion that racial animus was not a significant factor in the government's decisions. Overlooked by the Court were
military commander DeWitt's public statements which provided strong evidence that racial
antagonism was a primary factor in the government's actions. In his Final Recommendation to
the Secretary of War, on February 14, 1942, DeWitt wrote:
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by
migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and
third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States
citizenship, have become "Americanized," the racialstrains are undiluted ....

It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential
enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today.
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Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration
camp because of racial prejudice . . . . To cast this case into
outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers . . . merely confuses the issue.7

Hirabayashi articulated a standard of review which was then
generally applicable to the evaluation of administrative and economic
regulations. Chief Justice Stone's opinion focused on the collective
war power of Congress and the Executive. Its opinion avoided the
prickly question of whether Congress delineated adequate standards

in its delegation of authority to the executive and military by finding
that Congress, in enacting Pub. L. No. 503 on March 21, 1942, and
in passing appropriations measures, knew of and therefore ratified

DeWitt's proclamations of March 2 and 16 and his intention to issue
curfew and exclusion orders.7 9 This finding ignored the fact that
neither the executive order nor the congressional act embodied standards for guiding the military's actions.8 No limits were set. Within
the vague confines of the executive order's declaration of a danger of
Petition, supra note 27, at Final Report (emphasis added).
On April 13, 1943, testifying before Congress, DeWitt stated "[ilt makes no difference
whether he is an American citizen, he is still Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty .... We must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped
off the map." Hearings Before House Naval Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested
Areas, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, 740 (1943).
On April 14, 1943, DeWitt informed news media of his doubt about the loyalty of American nisei soldiers who, while on leave, wanted to enter excluded areas: "A Jap is a Jap,"
reprinted in CWRIC, supra note 10, at 222.
Assuming the existence of racial animus as a basis of the military's actions, Korematsu
stands as an anachronism in post-fourteenth amendment legal history.
78. 323 U.S. at 223.
79. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91, 102-04. See generally Prize Cases,
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863) (congressional approval of prior presidential actions "as if
they had been . . . done under previous express authority and direction of Congress.").
80. Compare Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 416-18 (1935) (rejecting the
National Industrial Recovery Act's declaration of emergency provision as providing the requisite standards for executive action and concluding that "Congress [improperly] left the matter
to the president without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased"); Kent v. Dulles, 307
U.S. 116, 129 (1958) ("[W]e will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute
[constitutional liberties]"); see also Dembitz, supra note 9, at 184 n.31.
The Hirabayshi Court in effect held that when Congress takes some supportive action
with knowledge of a broadly worded executive order and the military's contemplated restrictive
measures, Congress and the Executive will be deemed to have acted in concert and the government's powers will be at their zenith, even though Congress neither pre-authorized the military's actions nor set specific standards by which those actions could be judged. Firmage, The
War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. CoLo. L. REV. 65, 83 n.81 (1977)
("the Japanese-American war relocation cases demonstrate most pointedly and painfully the
expansive limits of the joint cooperative use of the war powers by the political branches.").
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"espionage and sabotage" the military was given free rein.
The opinion also did not explicitly build into its calculus the
counterveiling fifth amendment due process/liberty interests of those
restricted. It declared that the curfew was within the government's
war power if "in the light of all the facts and circumstances there
was any substantial basis for the conclusion ... that the curfew as
applied was a protective measure necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage" and if there was "reasonable ground for believing that the threat ... [was] real."8 Adopting a deferential approach characteristic of the rational basis standard,82 the Court
stated that the government was entitled to a broad discretion in its
determination of the "nature and extent of the threatened injury or
danger" and in its "selection of the means for resisting it."8 Accordingly, the Court conferred great deference to the military's "appraisal of facts."
The military commander's appraisal of facts . . . involved the
exercise of his informed judgment ... [T]hose facts ... support
81. 320 U.S. at 95 (emphasis added).
82. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and White, noted that the Court in fact
applied the rational basis standard in both Hirabayashiand Korematsu. In Hirabayashi,for
example, the Court, responding to a claim that a racial classification was rational, sustained a
racial classification solely on the basis of a conclusion in the double negative that it could not
say that the facts which might have been available "could afford no ground for differentiating
citizens of Japanese ancestry from other groups in the United States." 320 U.S. at 101. A
similar mode of analysis was followed in Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224, even though the Court
stated there that racial classifications were "immediately suspect" and should be subjected to
"the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216.
83. 320 U.S. at 93. The Court also noted that "it is not for any court to sit in review of
the wisdom of their [Executive and Congress] actions or substitute its judgment for theirs." In
certain respects, the Court's approach was more or less historically consistent with the Court's
review of restrictive racial legislation which was not on its face motivated by racial animus. In
Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), later overruled by Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), "reasonableness" and good faith were the only limitations placed upon
legislative racial classifications. "[Elvery exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and
extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for promotion of the public good, and not
for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class." 163 U.S. at 550.
Prior to Korematsu, the Court had also upheld state statutes mandating segregation in
schools, Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), public transportation, McCabe v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), beaches and bathhouses,
Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), affd, 350
U.S. 877 (1955), and parks, Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development, 133 F.
Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff d, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956).
It should be noted that none of these cases involved liberty interests as significant as
freedom from imprisonment without charges for an indefinite period, and none of these cases
were based upon military representations of necessity. Indeed, the Hirabayashiand Korematsu
opinions essentially ignored war powers cases calling for demanding judicial scrutiny of the
"necessity." See infra note 103.
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the judgment of the military commander, that the danger of espionage and sabotage to our military resources was imminent
84

Military commander DeWitt "appraised" two critical facts
which were deemed to "afford a rational basis for the decision." The
government asserted in its brief, and the HirabayashiCourt accepted
that, Japanese American "residents having ethnic affiliations with an
invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of
different ancestry," 8 and that there was insufficient time to identify
and deal with dangerous or disloyal Japanese individually. As to the
first "fact"-that ethnicity determines disloyalty-the Court deferred
to the military's judgment on a matter well beyond the realm of special military expertise. This "fact" was unsupported by any evidence
of record. The Court took judicial notice of what might have been
"some of the many considerations" of the military in ascertaining
this ostensible fact, and cited newspaper reports, congressional hearings, and various books and articles.8" Ignoring the indisputability
requirement of the judicial notice doctrine, the Court noted that Japanese Americans on the West Coast had not assimilated into the
American mainstream and had retained strong attachments to Japan,

which, by implication, predisposed them to loyalty to Japan during
war.8 7 In drawing this conclusion, the Court fully adopted a government argument based on racial myths and stereotypes8 8 and the
Court ignored a plethora of contrary information cited in the amicus
briefs of the Japanese American Citizens League and American
84. 320 U.S. at 103-04.
85. Id. at 101.
86. Id. at 99.
87. The Court noted that these attachments were fostered by Japanese language schools,
adherence to the Shinto religion, dual citizenship held by some, Kibei education for some, and
other Japanese community organizations. The Court further noted that these attachments to
Japan were enhanced by past anti-Asian discrimination on the West Coast. Id. at 98.
88. General DeWitt had determined that Japanese Americans were a "large, unassimilated, tightly-knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion." Final Report, supra note 27, at vii. See also Brief of the United States at
11, Hirabayashi,320 U.S. 81.
The CWRIC noted that this
evaluation is not a military one but one for sociologists or historians. It runs
counter to a basic premise on which the American nation of immigrants is built
- that loyalty to the United States is a matter of individual choice and not
determined by ties to an ancestral country. In the case of German Americans,
the First World War demonstrated that race did not determine loyalty, and no
negative assumptions were made with regard to citizens of German or Italian
descent during the Second World War.
CWRIC Report, supra note 10, at 7.
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Civil Liberties Union.89
As to the second "fact," the government produced no evidence
which showed an insufficiency of time to handle disloyalty on an
individual basis, and also produced no evidence or record of espionage, sabotage, or other acts of disloyalty by Japanese Americans."
Based on its deferential standard of review, however, and using a
double negative, the Court was able to affirm Hirabayashi's conviction by concluding:
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military
authoritiesand of Congress that there were disloyal members of
[the Japanese American] population, whose number and
strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained ....
Here the findings [of Commander DeWitt] of danger of espionage and sabotage, and of the necessity of the curfew order to
protect against them, have been duly made.91
The "findings" the Court was referring to as "having been duly
made" were nothing more than conclusory statements by DeWitt in
Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2 that the West Coast was subject
to a danger of "espionage and sabotage.'
Korematsu applied a similarly deferential if not even less demanding standard of review. Justice Black's Majority opinion" disposed of Korematsu's challenge to the evacuation by finding that the
exclusion issue was identical to the curfew issue and by citing the
Court's curfew decision in Hirabayashi." In doing so, the Court
failed to acknowledge the major difference in the severity of the restrictions. It also failed to address an important issue distinct to evacuation: 9' whether, assuming the existence of a danger of espionage
89. Brief of Japanese American Citizens League and American Civil Liberties Union,
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81. For a thorough discussion of the contrary information cited in the briefs see P. IRONS, supra note 10, at 305-06. After reviewing literature cited
in the brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Justice Murphy found that each of the
government's allegations "has been substantially discredited by independent studies made by
experts in these matters." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
90. See supra section IIA.
91. 320 U.S. at 99, 103 (emphasis added). See generally Tussman & tenBroek, Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 342, 372-74 (1949).
92. 320 U.S. at 86-87. The opinion also deemed the statement in the preamble to Executive Order No. 9066 of a danger of espionage and sabotage to be a "fact" indicating military
necessity. Id. at 102-03.
93. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Reed, Douglas and Rutledge joined in Justice
Black's opinion. Justice Frankfurter concurred in a separate opinion. Justices Roberts, Murphy and Jackson each authored dissenting opinions.
94. 323 U.S. 214, 218-19.
95. The Majority opinion even side-stepped consideration of the validity of the mass
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and sabotage, the mass evacuation "remedy" was appropriately and
narrowly tailored to meet the circumstances of the danger."
The Korematsu Majority did not subject the issues it addressed
to the "most rigid scrutiny." The Court focused singularly on the
sweeping conclusions of the DeWitt Report and, without inquiry
into their factual basis, adopted them as the justification for the evacuation. Concerning the need for mass evacuation due to the inadequacy of the curfew, the Court recited the general conclusion of the
military: "The military authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded that curfew provided
inadequate protection and ordered exclusion . . . . [E]xclusion of
those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary. . . .,9 The military's unsubstantiated contention of "insufficiency of time," which
formed the foundation of the Hirabayashi decision and which was
discredited by the undisclosed original DeWitt Final Report, was
also accepted in Korematsu: "[T]emporary exclusion of the entire
group was rested by the military on the same ground [that it was
impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal]."" Finally, in discussing the "real military danger," the Court
cited military conclusions rather than facts: "[Korematsu] was excluded because ... the proper military authorities feared an invasion
...and because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
from the West Coast temporarily . .

."

In his prophetic dissent, Justice Jackson questioned the Court's
deferential approach:
How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable
internment, holding somewhat incredibly that the detention issue was not before the Court
because Korematsu had not been interned. 323 U.S. 214, 221-22. Korematsu had been convicted of refusing to be moved from his San Leandro residence to an assembly center and
ultimately to an internment camp. Id. at 229-30 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The logical extension of the Court's reasoning was that only persons who submitted to internment and filed
habeas corpus petitions had standing to challenge the internment. Id. at 232 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting). The Majority thereby redefined and minimized the liberty interest at stake from
imprisonment without trial on account of race to geographical displacement.
96. The Korematsu Majority deferred to military judgment about the means selected for
preventing espionage and sabotage at defense installations, citing that congressional delegation
of authority to the military. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. PuB. L. No. 503, however, embodied
no standards to guide the military in determining the breadth, duration or severity of its measures. It made no reference to temporary detention at assembly centers or indefinite incarceration in camps.
97. 323 U.S. at 218.
98. Id. at 219.
99. 323 U.S. at 223.
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basis in necessity? No evidence whatever on that subject has
been taken by this or any other court .... So the Court, having
no real evidence before it, has no choice but to accept General
DeWitt's own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any
cross-examination, that what he did was reasonable.100
The Court's extreme degree of deference to military judgment
in Korematsu, with all its attendant dangers, was also without precedent. The Court did not cite any authority to support its unquestioning reliance on the military's conclusions.1"1 The war powers

cases cited in the Hirabayashi opinion referred generally to the expansive scope of the war power.'0 2 However, the cases cited in Hira-

bayashi as conferring wide discretion to the military under the government's war power's differed markedly from Hirabayashi and
Korematsu.'0 8 None of the cases cited counseled deference to military
judgment or involved due process claims of citizens who were de-

prived of their freedom without specific charges or trial. In declining
independent scrutiny of the factual foundation of the military's conclusions, the Court either ignored or summarily distinguished its

own precedents which had established the judiciary as guardian of
04
constitutional liberties during times of war or emergency.1

100. 323 U.S. at 245. See also Dembitz, supra note 9, at 193 ("The Korematsu opinion
indicates that there is no basis for invalidating war-time action by military authorities, save
perhaps by a showing of malice and a lack of good faith on the part of the military.").
101. The opinion did not specify why the military, whether acting on its own or pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority in the form of a criminal statute which provided
no standard for military action, should have its judgments about American civilians accepted
without question.
102. "The war power of the national government is the 'power to wage war successfully'." 320 U.S. at 93. (Although not quoted directly in Hirabayashithis tautological statement appears to be the driving force behind the Court's reasoning.)
103. The controversy in two of those cases, appropriately cited with the "cf." signal,
involved the interpretation and effect of war measures and not their underlying validity. See
Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 29 (U.S. 1827); Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 671 (U.S. 1862).
The other case, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 28 (1942), construed the Articles of War to determine whether the President was empowered to require accused "enemy belligerents" to stand
trial before a military rather than civil tribunal for specific hostile acts against the United
States.
104. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (U.S. 1851). [T]he emergency
must be shown to exist before taking can be justified. But it is not sufficient to
show that [the military officer] exercised an honest judgment, and took property
to promote public service; he must show by proof the nature and character of
the emergency, such as he had reasonable grounds to believe it to be ....
Id.
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)(1866);
United States v. Russell, 73 U.S. (4 Wall.) (1871); see also Keynes, Democracy, Judicial Review and the War Powers, 8 OHIo N.L. REV. 69, 75 (1981) ("During periods of war and
hostilities the courts provide a forum in which individuals and minorities can vindicate their
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In particular, the Korematsu opinion ignored the judicial
landmark of Ex Parte Milligan.'0" Miligan held that the military
lacked jurisdiction to try and punish civilians, even during times of
national rebellion, when civil courts are open and functioning. In
issuing a writ of habeas corpus, the Court held that the conviction of
a civilian by a military tribunal violated his constitutional rights
under the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments. Noting that a civilian's constitutional rights to a civil court trial by jury "cannot be
frittered away on any plea of state or political necessity," the Court
acknowledged that the judiciary during war must exercise great diligence to protect constitutional liberties against the aroused "passions
of men" and the weakened "restraints of law."1 6
The Court summarily distinguished Milligan from the Japa0 noting
nese American cases in Hirabayashiand Ex Parte Endo,"'
"the exercise of that [war emergency] power here involves no question of martial law or trial by military tribunals."' 0 8 The distinction
misses the point. According to Milligan, the military cannot try and
imprison civilians during war when the civil courts are open and
accessible. Yet Japanese American civilians were interned initially
by the military when the courts were open and accessible without
any trial at all.' 09
Why did the Court adopt an extremely deferential posture and
also fail to address squarely its earlier cases? The Commission on
rights when Congress and the President exceed their constitutional war and defense powers.")
The Court also ignored or dismissed, Freeman, Genisis, Exodus and Leviticus-Geneology,
Evacuation and Law, 28 CORN. L.Q. 414 (1943) which canvassed war power cases and discussed Mitchell, Sterling and Milligan as requiring government proof of "necessity" and
which ascertained an inadequate factual basis for the evacuation.
105. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) (1866).
106. The Court stated:
[11f society is disturbed by civil commotion - if the passions of men are aroused
and the restraints of law weakened, if not disregarded - these safeguards [of
liberty] need, and should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted [sic] with
the guardianship of the Constitution and laws. In no other way can we transmit
to posterity unimpaired the blessing of liberty, consecrated by the sacrifices of
the Revolution.
Id. at 8. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 123-24.
107. 323 U.S. 283, 297-98 (1944). Ex Parte Endo and Korematsu were announced at
the same time. Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court in Endo, followed an arduous
statutory route in granting Endo's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Douglas declared that the

War Relocation Authority, in charge of internment and release, lacked statutory authority to
continue to confine concededly loyal citizens pending the WRA's determination of a "safe"
locale for their release. The Court implied that mass internment was constitutionally permissible at least until individual loyalty was assessed.
108. 320 U.S. at 92; see also 323 U.S. at 297-98.
109. See Rostow, supra note 9, at 527.
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Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians ("CWRIC") has
suggested that the Court refrained from "any careful review of the
facts" and chose to "give great deference to the military judgment..
. rather than looking closely at the record" because this "was the
only plausible course for the court to follow if it were to conclude
that exclusion was constitutionally permissible."" '
Indeed, the
Court's contradictory language of heightened scrutiny and judicial
deference might be best explained not by analysis of legal doctrine
but by the quid pro quo involved in building a majority vote to uphold the government's actions."'
It is difficult now to predict with precision how the Supreme
Court would have ruled had the government presented all material
information in its possession. What is certain is that the Court's extremely deferential standard of review facilitated the government's
presentation of unsupported statements concerning military necessity.
Even though the ONI, FBI, FCC, and MID reports and the original Final Report undercut the factual basis of the government's legal
position, the government was able to conceal these reports because it
was not called upon to present any substantive factual justification
for its extraordinary actions.
In a larger view, the Court's deferential approach accorded almost complete autonomy to the military in its dislocation and detention of civilians residing outside the theater of actual hostilities. Just
as important, it signalled a hands-off role in reviewing alleged government war power excesses, including those detrimental to the most
fundamental of democratic liberties. The Court, without saying so
explicitly, made a profound value judgment affecting American democracy. Justice Jackson warned of the ominous implications.
[T]he Court for all time has validated the principle of racial
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting
I10. CWRIC, supra note 10, at 236-37. The CWRIC was established in 1980 by an
act of Congress. Its mission was to thoroughly investigate the treatment of Japanese Americans
during World War II and to recommend remedies. After taking testimony of 750 witnesses
and reviewing numerous documents and publications, the Commission concluded that there
was in fact no military necessity for the curfew or mass evacuation and that the "broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of
political leadership." Id. at 18. Note, however, the comment of the Chief Historian of the
United States Army Center of Military History: "I cannot accept the historical information
and conclusions offered in [the CWRICI report as authoritative from the viewpoint of a professional historian." Hearings on Japanese-American and Aleutian Wartime Relocation and
H.R. 3387, H.R. 4110 and H.R. 4322, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial No. 90, 79-81 (1984)
(statement of David F. Trask, Chief Historian, United States Army Center of Military
History).
111. See supra note 73.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

American citizens. The principle lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. 12
The human tragedy was the unjustified uprooting and internment of over 100,000 loyal Americans. The legal tragedy was both
that the Court accepted without question the government's statements of military justification and that the government distorted the

judicial process (at least by today's standards) to obtain approval of a
then on-going program. The result was an apparent lessening of
government accountability for military control over civilians-a result which, in view of recent Supreme Court rulings discussed below,
raises serious questions about the structure of American democracy.
III.

SEEING THROUGH MURKY WATERS: THE NEED FOR

CLARITY IN STANDARDS OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

Former Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that the
' 3
essence of law is "prophesies of what the courts will do in fact.""
By that he meant legal principles reflect societal values which enable
us to predict what behavior will be deemed acceptable in the future.
The law is thus valuable to society not only because of the justice it
achieves in deciding a particular dispute, but also because it informs
citizens and government of guidelines for forming present and future
behavior.
If we look into the well of wisdom and ask, "What legal standards of accountability now guide the federal government in restricting the civil liberties of Americans for reasons of military necessity
or national security?," no clear answer emerges. The waters of this
constitutional principle are murky. Prophesies are blurred, and underlying values difficult to discern. This section discusses the need
for clarity and balance, especially in light of Korematsu and recent
Supreme Court decisions.
A.

Korematsu's Legacy

One lesson of Korematsu is that grave social injustice is possible
in America during times of national frustration and fear if the government is given wide rein over the fundamental liberties of American civilians and is not held closely accountable to constitutional
112. 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (1978) ("The [Korematsu] decision represents the nefarious impact that
war and racism can have on institutional integrity and cultural health.").
113. NOONAN, PERSONS & MASKS OF THE LAW 67 (1976).
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standards by the courts. 14 Despite this lesson and Justice Jackson's
"loaded weapon" warning, Korematsu's principle of diminished government accountability lingers.'"
The Supreme Court, perhaps lacking the opportune controversy, has not overruled or formerly discredited the Korematsu decision or its principle of judicial deference to government claims of
military necessity. Nor has the Court announced in principle that
the demanding standards of review now normally applicable to government restrictions of constitutionally protected liberties are unaltered by the government's claim of military necessity or national security. At best, the decisions on these issues reflect an acceptance of
the Court's role as guardian of constitutional liberties during times
of war and upheaval, with notable exceptions. At worst, they reflect
ambiguity and vacillation."" Indeed, reminiscent of Korematsu, the
114. As stated by Judge Patel:
[Korematsuj stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress, the shield of military
necessity and national security must not be used to protect governmental actions
from close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of
international hostility and antagonisms, our institutions, legislative, executive
and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens
from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.
584 F. Supp 1406, 1420.
115. Diminished government accountability is Korematsu's legal legacy, whether the
case is viewed as articulating a strict scrutiny standard of review, but according almost total
deference to the military's unsubstantiated assertion of "necessity" or as applying a rational
basis standard of review due to the ostensible absence of racial animus as motivation for the
exclusionary orders. See supra notes 73-77 and 96-99 and accompanying text. Compare
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 294 (1954) (racial segregation in the field of education
held unconstitutional without showing of racial animus or bad faith). See generally Brest,
Foreward:In Defense of the Anti-DiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
116. The Court's approach to the clash of war powers and civil liberties has produced a
seemingly eclectic array of cases. The Court has generally subjected the military necessity
rationale of civil liberties restrictions to careful scrutiny. In notable exceptions, however, it has
appeared to be extremely deferential.
Concerning first amendment freedoms, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting presidential authority in the name of national security to restrain publication of the Pentagon Papers); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (invalidating blanket prohibition of employment of communist party members in defense facilities); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (applying a heightened first amendment
standard of review in upholding a federal statute prohibiting draft card burning). But see
Scheck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (the existence of war lessens first amendment
protections); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding military discretion to ban political speeches on open and unguarded public sidewalks on military bases).
Concerning fourth and fifth amendment freedoms, see e.g., United States District Court v.
United States, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (prohibiting warrantless electronic surveillance of civilians
in the interest of domestic security); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (invalidating blanket provision of Subversive Activities Control Act prohibiting issuance of pass-
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117
Supreme Court's recent opinions in Rostker v. Goldberg, Haig v.
2°
Agee,'" Regan v. Wald,"' and United States v. Albertini have
fueled perception of a trend towards diminished government account1 22
ability for national defense1 2' and national security restrictions of
ports to members of communist organizations); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (construing a federal statute as not authorizing secretary of state's blanket denial of passports to
communist party members). But see Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984); Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280 (1981); and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (discussed infra in section
IIIA); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding executive branch's denial of all passports
to Cuba following the Cuban missle crisis).
Concerning the sixth amendment see Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) (1867) (setting aside the military conviction of a civilian rebel because civil courts were accessible and
freely functioning); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (setting aside military convictions of civilians under martial law after the threat of invasion had clearly passed). But see
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding presidential authority under the Articles of
War to require accused "enemy belligerent" civilians to submit to military rather than civil
trials).
117. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

118. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
119. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984). Cf. Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (draft registration protestor's claim of selective prosecution rejected because of his failure to prove discriminatory intent, even though he was denied review of allegedly important government documents on that issue).
120. 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985).
121. In providing for national defense, the Constitution confers exclusive and joint war
powers upon Congress and the President. Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power to
raise funds to "provide for the common defense" (cl. 1); declare war (cl. 11); raise and support
the Army and Navy (cls. 12-13); make rules for governing the armed forces (cl. 14); organize
and call forth the militia (cls. 15-16); and enact laws "necessary and proper" to the execution
of those powers (cl. 18).
Article I, Section 9 empowers Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Article II,
Section 2 designates the President "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into actual Service of the United
States." Article IX, Section 4 confers power jointly to protect the states against invasion and
domestic violence.
The Constitution's lack of specific guidelines for exercises of war powers has contributed
to long-standing tension between Congress and the President. For an excellent discussion of
how this tension has "resulted in political and judicial definitions and redefinitions of the constitutionally acceptable exercise of the war power-both in terms of which branch is empowered to act and in terms of the proper scope of its authority," see Comment, supra note 19, at

128-33.
122. The government's power to protect the "security" of the nation has no specific
textual basis in the Constitution and its emergence has not been tied to any specific constitutional provision. Instead, the government's power to protect itself and society's democratic institutions against domestic and foreign threats, as "national security" may be broadly defined,
is generally considered in part an extension of the government's aggregation of war and foreign
affairs powers and in part an attribute of sovereignty. See Note, supra note 16, at 1131;
ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (1976).
War power measures in furtherance of national defense generally involve the military in
some capacity. In contrast, national security measures generally involve executive or legislative
action without direct military involvement. Combined, they comprise the self-protective powers
of the federal government.
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civil liberties. Viewed most critically, they suggest a judicial value
judgment that the government's self-protective concerns, whether latent or explicit, specific or general, justify essentially unreviewable
government restrictions of civil liberties. 2 Although these recent
cases have not cast this apparent value judgment into constitutional
principle-nowhere has the Court given doctrinal credence to former
Justice Douglas' statement that war powers "may be the great leveler of other rights"" 4-a hands-off judicial attitude is discernable.
B.

Recent Cases
2
1. Rostker v. Goldberg15

The controversy in Rostker centered upon the Selective Service
Act which empowered the President to require draft registration of
males but not females. The foreword to Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion is replete with language alluding to the special degree of
judicial deference to Congress' authority over national defense and
military affairs. 2 The Court acknowledged that Congress cannot
123. See generally Graney, supra note 68, at 733 ("The impact of Rostker on the constitutional safeguards of individual liberties vis-a-vis the war power is enormous. The Court
set a dangerous precedent by relaxing the constitutional safeguards of civilians when Congress
acts pursuant to the war power.").
124. DeFunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312, 340 n.20 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 451 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). The Korematsu majority opinion and the Hirabayashiopinion also ignored Sterling v. Constantin, decided only 12 years earlier. The Texas government had ordered military control over production operations, claiming that the producers were engaged in enormous physical waste and
were contributing to "insurrection." The Court rejected the state's contention that courts may
not review the sufficiency of the factual basis of military orders affecting civilians. Id. at 400.
Upon review of the record, the Court affirmed the district court's finding that "there was no
military necessity which, from any point of view, could be taken to justify the actions of the
Governor." Id. at 403-04. Interestingly, the Court was willing to require a sound factual
foundation in Sterling for military actions affecting property interests but was unwilling to do
so in Korematsu for military actions affecting personal freedom. Cf Moyer v. Peabody, 212
U.S. 78 (1909) and cases following it, e.g., United States ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 F.
208 (D. Wis. 1922); United States ex rel. McMaster v. Wolters, 268 F. 69 (S.D. Tex. 1920).
125. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
126. The Court stated:
This is not, however, merely a case involving the customary deference accorded
congressional decisions. The case arises in the context of Congress' authority
over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the
court accorded Congress greater deference . . . . This Court has consistently
recognized Congress' 'broad constitutional power' to raise and regulate armies
and navies .... Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in this
area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked.
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65.
This non-interventionist view of the Court's role differed markedly from the Court's earlier conception of its role in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) and Kennedy v.
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disregard the Constitution when it acts concerning military affairs. It
implied, however, that a lessening of judicial scrutiny is appropriate.
"In that area, as in any other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause ... but the tests and limitations to
be applied may differ because of the military context." 1 7
In addressing the gender discrimination claims, the Court refused to specify the standard of review and declined any further "refinement" of the level of scrutiny. 28 Without saying so explicitly, the
Court seems to have applied the rational basis standard 129 instead of
the intermediate standard ordinarily applied in gender discrimination cases.1 30 Despite the gender classification and despite the President's official recommendation to expand registration to include
women, the Court stated that it deferred to congressional judgment
because Congress had fully debated the gender issue.1 31 The Court
found that Congress did not act "unthinkingly" or "reflexively and
not for any considered reason." 1 2
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1961). O'Brien noted Congress' "broad and sweeping"
power to raise armies. 391 U.S. at 377. It nevertheless deemed it appropriate to apply an
exacting first amendment standard, given the importance of the liberty involved, to evaluate
indirect government restrictions on symbolic political speech. Mendoza-Martinez noted Congress' plenary power to raise armies. It also acknowledged, however, the "greatest temptation
to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees" during emergencies and the judiciary's role in providing "watchful care" in protecting constitutional liberties. 372 U.S. at 165.
127. 453 U.S. at 67 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 69. Justice Rehnquist did not specify the standard of review for reasons
which seemed to contradict the entire first section of his opinion concerning the substantial
deference accorded congressional war power actior: "Announced degrees of 'deference' to legislative judgments, just as levels of 'scrutiny' which this Court announces that it applies to particular classifications . . . may all too readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result." Id. at 69-70.
129. "In deciding the question before us, we must be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence
for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch." Id. at 68.
130. In addition, the Court hinted, without expressly stating so, that the exemption of
women satisfied the intermediate standard of review. "No one could deny that under the test of
Craig v. Boren, supra, the Government's interest in raising and supporting armies is an 'important governmental interest' "; Id. at 70, and "Itlhe exemption of women from registration is
not only sufficiently but also closely related to Congress' purpose [raising combat forces] in
authorizing registration . . . Craig v. Boren." Id. at 79. Cf Sedlock, Recent Decisions Rosther v. Goldberg, 20 DuQ. L. REV. 519, 533 (1982) (indicating that the Court in Rostker
adopted the "middle-tier" standard of review).
131. Id. at 65.
132. Id. at 71. In attempting to distinguish other cases involving illegal gender classifications, the Court concluded that the decision of congressional committees to exclude women
"clearly establishes" that the decision to exempt women from registration was not an "accidental byproduct of the traditional way of thinking about females." Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
This conclusion is dubious. Unanimity of decision by congressional committees can hardly be
said to "clearly establish" that a decision is free from outmoded sexist views. Indeed, in the
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Finally, the Court concluded that the Act passed constitutional
muster because women and men are not similarly situated groups
since federal statutes and tradition prohibited women from combat.' The Court, however, failed to examine the validity of those
statutes other than to cite the practices of other countries and congressional preference. Concerning conscription of women for noncombat roles, the Court accepted Congress' conclusion, based on military representations, that the inclusion of women recruits for noncombat roles would create significant administrative problems concerning military preparedness and future mobilization.1" 4 The district court had found this conclusion to be illogical and unsupported
by evidence, especially because the military had embarked on an active program to recruit women."' The Court reversed the district
court's judgment which had invalidated the all-male draft, and stated
that the district court "was quite wrong in undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence [whether the inclusion of women
would be "positively detrimental to the important goal of military
flexibility"] rather than adopting an appropriate deferential examination of Congress' evaluation of that evidence."' 3 6
Taken most narrowly, Rostker seems to fit the established and
limited principle of judicial deference concerning governmental controls over military personnel, 3 1 as distinguished from military control over civilians. The opinion denotes Congress' paramount power
to raise armed forces' 88 as "control over military operations and
personnel."'' 3 9
context of racial concerns, a near unanimous Congress passed the criminal statute involved in
Korematsu and was deemed to have ratified the curfew and exclusion.
133. Id. at 78. The Court thereby implied that the male-only draft provision did not
present a suspect gender classification because it did not treat differently persons "similarly
situated." Cf Schleslinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
134. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 81.
135. Id. at 63.
136. Id. at 83.
137. See infra note 174.
138. Nor can it be denied that the imposing number of cases from this Court
previously cited suggest judicial deference to such congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority
to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance
is challenged.
453 U.S. at 70.
Involuntary military service is the one sacrifice of civilian freedom specifically contemplated by the Constitution. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154 (1961) ("One
of the most important of these [obligations of citizenship] is to serve the country in time of war
and national emergency.").
139. Rostker cited the following cases: Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (pro-
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Rostker's broad language, however, can also be construed expansively: congressional war power measures that intentionally discriminate against civilian women are subject to the toothless rationality test. This implies that the exercise of congressional war powers
attenuates the standard of review.' 40
2.

Haig v. Agee"' and Regan v. Wald"'

The breadth of Rostker's language and its ambiguous message
about standards of review are especially unsettling in light of two
recent cases involving executive responses to increasing tensions with
Cuba.
Haig upheld the Secretary of State's discretion to revoke passports of citizens deemed to pose a threat to national security. Chief
Justice Burger's 1981 opinion is replete with conflicting signals. The
opinion acknowledged that the President's power over foreign rela4 It then declared, howtions is subject to constitutional limitations.
ever, that the "freedom to travel abroad with ...

a passport ...

is

subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations.' 144 Integral to the Court's value ordering was the premise that
''no governmental interest is more compelling that the security of the
Nation ....Protection of the foreign policy of the United States is a
governmental interest of great importance."'"
motion policies for navy personnel); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("composition,
training, equipping and control of a military force"); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)
(Uniform Code of Military Justice applicable to military personnel); Middendorf v. Henry,
425 U.S. 25 (1976) (summary court-martial of military personnel); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348 (1980) (restraint of right to petition by military personnel); Simmons v. United States, 406
F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969) ("necessity method of selection,
and composition of our defense forces.") See supra note 179. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976) is the only case discussed which involved liberties of civilians, and that case involved
activities on a military base and was justified by the need to maintain discipline over military
personnel.
140. Rostker's sweeping language of minimal judicial scrutiny was reiterated recently in
Chappell v. Wallace in the context of internal military affairs. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). Chappel
held that enlisted military personnel cannot maintain a damage suit against superior officers
for alleged constitutional violations. The unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment and Congress' failure to provide a statutory remedy in such situations constituted "special factors" which precluded the availability of a Bivens-type remedy. See generally Selective
Service System v. Minnesota Public Service Research Group, 104 S.Ct. 3348 (1984) (upholding the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 which denies federal financial aid to
male students failing toregister for the draft.)
141. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
142. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
143. 453 U.S. at 289 n.17.
144. Id. at 306.
145. Id. at 307. In view of this value ordering, the Court stated, "Imlatters intimately
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Haig's apparent subordination of the right to travel abroad to
national security interests as a matter of constitutional principle is
explained technically by the Court's relegation of that right to the
category of "non-fundamental" rights."'" In the larger view, the
opinion's sweeping language of judicial deference concerning national security matters and its diminution of the right restricted suggest a semantic weighing approach in which asserted security interests of the nation inevitably prevail over an individual's readily
47
contractable liberty interests.
The Court's recent decision in Regan is also illustrative. Regan
involved the Department of Treasury's unilateral restriction of
American currency transactions in Cuba. The restriction had the anticipated although unspecified effect of precluding all business and
political, and most tourist travel to Cuba. Its purpose was to shrink
Cuba's pool of resources for supporting "armed violence and terrorism." The restriction was rooted in the Trading with the Enemy Act
48
and the executive's foreign policy power.
related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention." Id. at 292. See also Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 1533 (1985). ("Few
interests can be more compelling than a nation's need to ensure its own security .... Unless a
society has the capability and will to defend itself from aggressions of others, constitutional
protections of any sort have little meaning.")
146. "The freedom to travel outside the United States must be distinguished from the
right to travel within the United States." 453 U.S. at 306. The Court reasoned that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, made applicable to the federal government by the fifth amendment's due process clause, protects only interstate travel. But see
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)
which included travel abroad among constitutionally protected liberties.
147. See Paust, supra note 18, at 739 (commenting on Haig and the illusion of constitutional limits to executive power "if previously recognized constitutional freedoms are interpreted away or depleted in order to ... assure that 'governmental interests' in 'national security and foreign policy' will always prevail.").
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), the Court avoided careful judicial scrutiny of the
military necessity justification for restrictions of civilian political speech by narrowing the
scope of first amendment protections on military bases. Greer upheld military regulations that
prohibited civilian distribution of literature which "appeared" to the military base commander
to present a "clear danger" to military loyalty or discipline.
In apparent conflict with Flowers v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972), Greer deferred
to the military's control over civilian speech because it deemed the site of distribution of political literature-an open, uncontrolled street and sidewalk of a military base-not a public forum for expressive activity.
The dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall suggested that the majority's approach
was motivated by an excessively deferential attitude towards all national defense-related matters, cautioning that the first amendment should not evaporate with "the mere intonation of
interests such as national defense, military necessity or domestic security." Id. at 852.
148. A 1982 amendment to Regulation 560 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
(CACR) severely restricted travel-related expenditures in Cuba. The CACR, which were originally promulgated under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), arose out of a declara-

38
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Through an arduous analysis of legislative history, the Court
found that Congress intended to exempt the particular restriction
from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act which required prior congressional consultation and a declaration of national
emergency. In disposing of the right to travel issue, Justice Rehnquist, joined by four justices, found that the restriction was justified
by "weighty concerns of foreign policy." '149 As to the legitimacy of
those concerns, the opinion cited Zemel v. Rusk'50 and stated: "Matters relating 'to the conduct of foreign relations ... are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.' "11 Citing Haig v.
Agee, the Court found a State Department affidavit opining that
Cuba supported terrorism in the Western Hemisphere to provide
"an adequate basis under the Due Process Clause ...to sustain the
1' 52
President's decision.
The executive's broad authority to conduct diplomatic and economic relations with foreign countries is well-established.15 Regan,
however, appears to wander beyond safe borders. Unlike Haig, the
government in Regan made no attempt to establish that the restricted
individuals, by traveling to Cuba, personally posed a national security risk. 5 4 Regan implies that the Court will uphold blanket restriction

of "peace time emergency" following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 104 S. Ct. 3026
(1984). In 1977, Congress enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) which required a declaration of national emergency and consultation with Congress
prior to the promulgation of restrictive measures such as amended section 560. The IEEPA,
however, exempted from these requirements then existing "authorities" conferred upon the
President by the TWEA. Id. at 3027. Section 560 at that time did not restrict travel expenditures in Cuba. Id. The plaintiffs in Regan challenged the amendment to section 560 was
violative of IEEPA requirements, claiming that the exemption provision was inapplicable and
was violative of the fifth amendment right to travel.
149. Id. at 3038-39.
150. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). The Regan opinion equated the two cases because their respective restrictions "made no effort to deny passports on the basis of political belief or affiliation,
but simply imposed a general ban on travel to Cuba following the break in diplomatic relations." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
151. 104 S.Ct. 3026, 3038-39.
152. Id. at 3039. McCarthy era cases Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1951) and
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) concerned statements about the expansive
scope of congressional and executive foreign policy control over Communists in the United
States.
153. The Court has acknowledged the executive's expansive scope of authority over the
"vast external realm" of "foreign policy and national defense," implicitly distinguishing external relations from control over domestic threats to national security. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280, 291 (1981). "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations." Id. (quoting Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. v. United
States, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)).
154. Juxtaposed to Haig's expansive language concerning foreign policy and its devalu-
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tions of civil liberties imposed under the aegis of the executive's foreign policy power even if the restrictions are justified by vaguelydefined and largely unsubstantiated threats to national security.
3.

United States v. Albertini"5 '

Most recently, in the context of national defense, a majority of
the Supreme Court appeared to emasculate the third prong of the
heightened first amendment standard for incidental regulations of
political speech. James Albertini was convicted of violating a military base commander's bar order prohibiting Albertini from entering
an Air Force base in Hawaii. The bar order was issued in 1972
because Albertini had poured blood on Air Force records as a protest
against the Vietnam War. In 1981 Albertini entered the base to distribute anti-nuclear war materials during a base open-house in
which military weaponry and preparedness were displayed to the
public.
In evaluating the constitutional validity of the procedures authorizing the bar order, Justice O'Connor, writing for five other justices, appropriately cited the heightened first amendment standard
articulated in United States v. O'Brien."6" The third prong of that
standard requires that the "incidental regulation of First Amendment freedoms [be] no greater than essential to achieve the [substantial government] interest. 15 7 In Robel v. United States,88 the Court
forcefully articulated the policies underlying the "less drastic impact" standard for first amendment cases in a national defense context, and applied that standard in invalidating a congressional prohibition of employment by government contractors of communist party
ation of the right to travel abroad, was the Court's finding of a definite and immediate threat
to members of the United States intelligence services posed by a particular individual restricted
from travel. That individual, a former CIA agent, openly vowed to disrupt CIA activities
abroad, id. at 282, n.2, and his prior disclosures of sensitive intelligence information abroad
led to violence. Id. at 285, n.7. He had been deported from other countries for threatening
their security. Id. at 308 n.59. The Court affirmed the Secretary of State's findings of "a
substantial likelihood of 'serious damage' to national security or foreign policy as a result of a
passport holder's activities" and no other "avenue open to the government to limit these activities." Id. at 308-09.
155. 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985).
156. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (rejecting a first amendment challenge to a federal statute
prohibiting, inter alia, draft card burning, finding no narrower means of furthering the government's important interest in assuring immediate draft status identification); Wayte v.
United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985) (rejecting a draft registration protestor's challenge of
selective prosecution of only persons actively opposing registration).
157. Id. at 377.
158. 389 U.S. 258 (1968).
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members on private premises deemed "defense facilities.

' 159

The an-

alytical construct established in Robel focused on furthering the government's security interest without unnecessarily restricting the first
amendment freedoms at stake.
The Albertini Majority, however, ignored Robel and in effect
rewrote the "no greater than essential standard" by focusing solely
upon whether the government's interest was furthered at all by the
restriction. No consideration was given to the restriction's impact
upon the constitutional liberty:
Nor are such regulations invalid simply because there is some
imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.
...Instead, an incidental burden on speech is no greater than
essential, and therefore is permissible under O'Brien, so long as
the neutral regulation promotes a substantialgovernment interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.6
The Court seems to be saying that if the government's interest alone
is better served with the restriction than without it, the restriction
passes constitutional muster. This decision appears to relegate the
previously heightened first amendment standard to its rational basis
step-cousin.
Whether the Albertini majority intended to make a sweeping
revision of first amendment standards is unclear. What does emerge,
however, is an apparent value judgment favoring expansive, if not
unfettered government authority to restrict civil liberties when the
government asserts a national defense or security rationale. 6 1
159. Recognizing that the government's interests in protecting security at defense facilities was "not insubstantial," the Court focused on "less drastic impact," noting that "precision
of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedom." Id. at 265. The Court found that the provision's blanket employment prohibition encompassed inactive Communist Party members and those members who disagreed with the
Party's unlawful goals; it also encompassed jobs unconnected to sensitive security matters. Id.
at 266. The Court thus determined that the restriction could be more narrowly drawn to
achieve its purpose. It could prohibit employment of individuals who by personal belief and job
opportunity posed a threat of espionage and sabotage to sensitive operations, without prohibiting employment of those who did not. So narrowed, the restriction would address the government's asserted security concerns and have a less drastic impact on the first amendment right of
association. Robel followed the approach outlined in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964) (invalidating as overly broad a section of the Subversive Activities Control Act
making it unlawful for any member of a communist organization to apply for a passport), and
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (construing a federal statute as not authorizing the Secretary of State's blanket denial of passports to members of the Communist Party).
160. 105 S. Ct. 2897 (emphasis added).
161. See also CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985). Sims upheld the CIA director's
refusal to disclose, pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request, the names of institutions
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The apparent value judgments and expansive language of
Rostker, Haig, Regan and Albertini signal potentially diminished
government accountability over matters involving "national security." This raises serious concerns about the accommodation of government self-protective power and civil liberties and about guidelines
to future government conduct.
IV.

TOWARD A BETTER ACCOMMODATION OF GOVERNMENT
SELF-PROTECTIVE POWERS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

As global tensions continue," 2 a clear articulation of constitutional principles is needed. These principles must afford the government ample leeway to tackle legitimate national dangers and, at the
same time, reduce the potential of Korematsu-type government overreaction to limited or illusory threats in the name of military necessity or national security.
A.

The Proposal

Suggested here is an organizing principle concerning selection of
standards of judicial review. It represents a synthesis of existing
principles and requires neither the development of new substantive
doctrine nor the direct overruling of case law. The principle has
been neither adopted nor rejected by the Supreme Court. The principle is this: Except as to actions under civilly-declared martial law,
the standard of judicial review of government restrictions of civil liberties of Americans is not altered or attenuated by the government's
contention that "military necessity" or "national security" justifies
and individuals participating in the CIA-financed MKULTRA project established in the
1950's to counter perceived Soviet advances in brain-washing techniques. Several Americans
died as a result of tests administered to them without their knowledge. The Court held that
under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director had "wide-ranging authority to protect
intelligence sources" and that "it is the responsibility of the Director ... not that of the
judiciary to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors." Id. at 1894. Justice Marshall's
stinging dissent addressed the Majority's view that courts are not appropriate or competent
bodies to review the "weighing" process. The Majority, he noted, completely ignored Congress' express intention in amending the National Security Act to have courts scrutinize executive determinations of confidentiality as a means of balancing government security needs with
the public's interest in disclosure.
At one time, this Court believed that the judiciary was not qualified to undertake this task .... Congress, however, disagreed, overruling both a decision of
this Court and a Presidential veto to make clear that precisely this sort of judicial role is essential if the balance that Congress believed ought to have been
struck between disclosures and national security is to be struck in practice.
Id. at 1898.
162. See supra notes 15-19.
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the challenged restrictions.
In operation, this means that the standard of review of governmental action is to be determined according to the existing constitutional doctrine which focuses on the right restricted. That standard is
not altered by the government's assertion that its powers of self-protection are involved. The nature of the government's self-protective
justification and the significance of the government interest asserted
are but ingredients in the application of the fixed constitutional
calculus. Thus, a heightened standard of review will be applied to
evaluate government restrictions of constitutionally-protected liberties16 ostensibly justified by military necessity or national security.
Government restrictions of other individual interests, when justiciable, will be evaluated by the rational basis standard, whatever the
justification for the restrictions.
Is this proposed principle functional? Is it viable? Several rudimentary questions require examination:
Does the principle in operation protect recognized civil liberties
at the expense of the government's ability to defend the country
against legitimate dangers?
Does the principle broaden the courts' historical role beyond
that in constitutional adjudication and embroil the judiciary in matters beyond its competence?
Does the principle synthesize existing case law or does it require an overruling of precedent?
The following discussion of these questions suggests that the
proposed principle is viable and indeed salutary for four reasons.
First, it structures an accommodation of competing constitutional
concerns-government self-preservation and individual liberties-without creating or expanding existing constitutional rights. 64
163. As discussed supra note 11, "constitutionally protected personal liberties" are the
civil liberties deemed essential to a functioning democracy and just society and are accorded
special protection from governmental interference by the amendments to the Constitution, either by textual reference or judicial construction. See generally Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1962) (individual liberties fundamental to American
institutions are not to be destroyed under the pretext of preserving those institutions). That
special protection is manifested in heightened standards of judicial review. United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 272 (1967) (each regulation must be examined in terms of its potential
impact on fundamental rights, the importance of the end sought and the necessity for the
means adopted) (Brennan, J., concurring).
164. In operation, the suggested principle by-passes the debate about judicial identification of fundamental rights not explicitly recognized by the text of the Constitution. See supra
note 11 and infra note 195. In a particular dispute, an evolving body of law identifying fundamental liberties is first applied independent of the suggested principle. Potential government
justifications for restrictions of fundamental liberties, such as military necessity or national
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Second, it is rooted in the law's historical recognition of a judiciary
"watchful"

over civil liberties during times of national stress. 1'

Third, it does not extend the judiciary beyond the boundaries of its
competence. Finally, especially in view of the ambiguity created by
recent court decisions reminiscent of Korematsu, it brings a measure
of clarity to the law without requiring direct overturning of wellsettled doctrine.
B. An Accommodation of Government Self-Protective Powers and
Civil Liberties
The government needs flexibility to counter threats to its institutions and people, and to deal with national emergencies. Just as
important, especially during times of national stress, cherished democratic rights to speech, association, and religion; racial and gender
equality; unfettered voting; and imprisonment only upon indictment
and trial and due process need safeguarding. Such an accommodation is essential to a functioning democracy. Overemphasis on the
latter leaves the government weak in defense of the country against
actual danger."" Overemphasis on the former means that the very
liberties the country is attempting to defend against external threat
are lost.

7

The importance of the suggested principle is that it accommodates competing values and establishes parameters for guiding future
government conduct."0 8 It says that, according to existing constitusecurity, are not factors in this threshold analysis. When the liberty involved is deemed fundamental according to existing doctrine, the suggested principle applies to assure that the government's asserted self-protective justification does not attenuate the standard of review.
165. See infra section IV D.
166. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 312. ("[U]nless government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society
itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered."). Id.
167. As acknowledged in United States v. Robel: "IT]his concept of national defense
cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to
promote such a goal. Implicit in the term national defense is the notion of defending those
values and ideals which set this Nation apart." 389 U.S. at 264. Former President Eisenhower
defined the problem as the "coalescence of military and industrial power" and its threat to
democratic liberties and processes:
[Tihis conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience .. . . [W]e must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence ... by the military-industrial complex ...
. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or
democratic process.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1961, p. 22 (cited in Warren, infra note 176, at 202-03).
168. To a certain extent, a standard of review is a concept malleable in the hands of
those who apply it in a particular instance. It can be stretched and twisted into a "facile
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tional doctrine, the government is generally free to undertake reasonable or even merely expedient action in defense of the country when
"fundamental liberties" of Americans are not restricted. For example, in enacting war-related measures regulating the civilian economy; 169 initiating and conducting war or hostilities abroad; 170 in de17 1
ciding upon military weaponry, manpower needs and deployment;
in dealing with aliens of enemy countries; 17 2 or in undertaking forabstraction ...used to justify a result." Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 70. In the larger
view, however, a standard of review, and particularly a heightened standard of review, is an
expression of societal value-ordering. It functions as a guidepost to future conduct both for the
government to assess the likely validity of an intended restriction, and for individuals to assess
the propriety of their response to government restrictions.
This appears to have been a salient effect of a heightened standard of review in gender
discrimination cases. See Women's Issues Survive Supreme Court's Swing to the Right, San
Francisco Examiner, August 19, 1984, at A-12, col. 1-6.
169. War power regulations of civilian economic interests are accorded considerable judicial deference. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919)
(upholding federal war power legislation prohibiting the sale of liquor after termination of
World War I but before the end of military demobilization); McKinley v. United States, 249
U.S. 397 (1919) (upholding the Secretary of War's delegated authority to prohibit houses of
prostitution in civilian areas near military installations); Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135 (1919) (upholding strict congressional regulation of railroads
during war); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (the existence of war and attendant
"national defense and security needs" deemed sufficient justification for the Emergency PriceControl Act which authorized administrative determination of rents for defense area housing);
Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (upholding federal legislation which continued rent
control after the end of the war, noting that Congress' war power extends to the remediation of
evils arising out of the exigencies of war). Economic interests, at least since the essential demise of doctrines of economic due process and liberty of contract, (see Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) do not fall within the
special category of fundamental liberties.
170. Executive and legislative decisions about the initiation and conduct of military hostilities are generally deemed "political questions" and therefore non-justiciable issues. See, e.g.,
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974)
(the President's decision to bomb Cambodia after removal of American forces is a "military
and diplomatic" matter beyond the competency of the court); Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller,
262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) ("[T~he power which declared the necessity [of war] is the power to
declare its cessation, and what the cessation requires. The power is legislative. A court cannot
estimate the effects of a great war and pronounce their termination at a particular moment of
time.") For an excellent discussion of the classical and prudential formulations of the political
question doctrine, see Thomas, Presidential War-Making Power: A Political Question? 35
S.W.L.J. 897 (1981).
171. See, e.g., Gillian v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1975) (the "training, weaponry and order
of the Ohio National Guard" is non-justiciable); Bertlesen v. Cooney, 213 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954) (the level of military manpower is non-justiciable).
172. The federal government's plenary power over aliens during hostilities derives from
the executive's conferred authority over foreign affairs and the inherent authority of a sovereign nation dealing with threats from foreign nations. See, e.g., Harisades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1951); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Narenji v. Civiletti: Equal
Protection and the Iranian Crisis, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 101 (1981).
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eign policy measures to meet foreign threats to national security. 7 '
Under existing doctrine, the government can also act upon "some
rational basis," for the most part, to restrict the liberties of military
personnel."7 4
Much more is required, however, to justify impositions upon
those liberties of American civilians deemed most fundamental by
general constitutional doctrine.' 75 According to the suggested princi173. See supra note 153.
174. Courts have long recognized the need for special rules of conduct and discipline for
military personnel whose "primary business" is to "fight or be ready to fight" in defense of the
country. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
That recognition is rooted in the Constitution (Subsections 12 and 13 of Section 8, Article I of
the Constitution give Congress the power to raise and support the Army and Navy, and subsection 14 empowers Congress to create special rules for governance of the armed services); the
congressional enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. § 801 (et seq.
(1983)), and the historically-established difference between the needs of a military system and
those of civilian society. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (discussing in depth the
historical roots of the Court's acknowledgment that "the military is, by necessity, a specialized
society separate from civilian society"); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757. ("The
laws and traditions governing [military] discipline have a long history . . . they are founded on
unique military exigencies as powerful now as in the past."); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S.
at 38 (noting "the difference between the diverse civilian community and the much more
tightly regimented military community.").
In view of the military's need for special rules, the Court has indicated its general reluctance to scrutinize carefully the administration of those rules. Middendorf v. Henry, quoting
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) ("[TIhe rights of men in the armed forces must
perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this
adjustment. The Framers especially entrusted that task to Congress."). 425 U.S. at 43. The
Court thus has on occasion narrowed its scope of inquiry and deemed restrictions "permissible
within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it." Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. at 758. See generally Martin v. Mott, 12 U.S. 19 Wheat. (1827) (approving
military law based on custom and usage); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); United
States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
Not all restrictions of liberties of military personnel, however, are immune from demanding judicial scrutiny. Indeed the Court has indicated that under certain conditions restrictions
of military personnel are subject to exacting judicial scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 683 (1974) (declaring discriminatory measures against women "inherently suspect,"
the Court subjected Congress' advantageous treatment of male military personnel in conferring
dependency benefits to "strict scrutiny"). Unfortunately, the Court has not adopted a principled means of determining when full constitutional protection is to be afforded the rights of
military personnel and when it is not. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 769 (1974)
(Douglas, J. dissenting) (Douglas noted that while in some circumstances limitations on speech
of military personnel are justified, the government cannot prohibit free speech by personnel at
all times.); cf., Dronenburg, v. Zeck, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (the constitutional right
of privacy does not encompass homosexuality and therefore a heightened standard of review
should not be applied to Navy regulations authorizing discharge of homosexuals in the Navy).
175. When threats to the nation's security become so overwhelming that the "branches
of the government are unable to function, or their functioning would itself threaten the public
safety," such as during war, civil authority can declare rule by martial law to "preserve order
and to insure public safety." Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1946) (Stone,
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pie, the government is empowered to restrict fundamental liberties
for reasons of military necessity or national security only when the
restriction is justified by compelling or substantial government interests which can be established by a credible basis in fact and when
the restriction is tailored narrowly to the government's justification.' 7 6 Conversely, the government cannot justify such restrictions,
as it did in Korematsu, if they are based on stereotypes, half-truths,
7
archaic tradition, ill-supported rumor, supposition, or conjecture.1 7
The overall impact of the suggested principle on the government's vast self-protective powers would be relatively minimal.
Checks to governmental excesses in the name of military necessity or
national security through exacting judicial scrutiny would apply only
when constitutional doctrine ordinarily demands heightened scrutiny.
And if the country is at war, surely the most exigent of circumstances, and the defense of the country or part of the country requires the suspension of civil liberties, the government can do so by
declaring martial law. Until conditions become so extreme that martial law is appropriate, the ordinary standards of judicial review
apply.
C. The Role of a "Watchful"Judiciary During Times of National
Stress
Two premises about judicial function underlie the suggested
principle. The first, which concerns the judiciary's role in constitutional adjudication, is that the dangers inherent in congressional or
executive restrictions of fundamental liberties of Americans during
times of national stress impel careful judicial scrutiny of such restrictions. The second premise, which concerns judicial competence, is
that the judicial method of decisionmaking lends itself to fair evaluations of government determinations of military necessity and national
security. This section examines the first premise and its roots in judiC.J., concurring). Martial rule temporarily suspends the exercise of most civil liberties. By
requiring the declaration of martial law as a triggering device for lessened judicial scrutiny, the
principle guarantees that the danger involved is more real than perceived and that civil authorities have ultimate control over the liberties of the civilian population.
176. Former Chief Justice Warren acknowledged the "separation and subordination of
the military establishment" to be a "compelling principle" of democracy. Warren, The Military Bill of Rights, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 197 (1962). Upon historical review he found that
judicial deference to claims of "military necessity in defense of the nation" demonstrated "that
such a restriction upon the scope of review is pregnant with danger for individual freedom"
and that the "danger inherent in the existence of a huge military establishment" required that
the courts apply an "exacting standard" of review. Id.
177. See infra notes 214-15.
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cial history. The following section examines the second premise.
Two conflicting views emerge in the debate about the judiciary's
role in reviewing clashes of government war powers and civil liberties. One is a non-interventionist view of almost total judicial deference to the war power judgments by the political branches. 178 Its
basic rationale is that the Constitution does not expressly empower
the politically unaccountable judiciary to second-guess the popularly
elected political branches, and that the political branches, unencumbered by the judicial method, are better equipped to deal with the
exigencies underlying war power and national security actions.1 79
Integral to this view is a belief in the able functioning of the political
branches' system of checks and balances, buttressed by an informed
electorate that can express through the ballot any displeasure with
the political branches.
The other view-a view predominantly reflected in the Supreme Court's decisions-is that the judiciary provides "watchful
care" over constitutional liberties, especially during apparent crises. 8 Under this rationale, political checks and balances against
government excesses are predicated either on executive self-restraint
or on majority rule by elected representatives with specific constituencies. Without careful judicial review, those in the minority and
those without political influence are vulnerable to a military or president supported by "intemperate [political] majorities," especially
during crises. 8 The tension between these views is an offspring of
178. In his concurring opinion in Korematsu, Justice Frankfurter noted the adage that
the "war power of the government 'is the power to wage war successfully' " and suggested that
courts should refrain from scrutinizing government exercises of its war power: "To find that
the Constitution does not forbid the military measures now complained of does not carry with
it approval of that which Congress and the Executive did. That is their business, not ours."
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. at 224-25. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) articulates a similar view: "The case arises in the context
of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other
areas has the Court accorded Congress greater deference."
179. See generally Keynes, supra note 104, at 69-70.
180. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 8 (1867). Milligan noted that the existence of war or generally exigent circumstances, of themselves, do not abrogate constitutional
guarantees: "No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit
of man than that any of [the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government." Id. at 121; accord Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 649-50 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Accordingly, during commotion, when
"the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened," constitutional liberties
"need and should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted [sic] with the guardianship of
the Constitution and laws" - the courts. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 124.
181. See Keynes, supra note 104, at 75 ("Since a basic objective of American consitutionalism is to advance the individual's freedom or liberty, judicial review can serve to protect
individuals and minorities against repressive and intemperate majorities"); REVELEY, WAR
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role in constitutional

Wisdom can be drawn from both views. Courts generally
should refrain from interfering in the war power and national security decisions of the elected political branches. Mistakes generally
should be' corrected through political checks and balances and
through the vote of political constituencies. Careful judicial scrutiny,
however, is appropriate if not essential in special situations-when
profound and irreparable consequences will flow directly from excesses of the moment by the popularly elected political branches.18 8
The question, therefore, is not whether but when, and in what special situations, are courts to impose themselves upon the political
process and to scrutinize the self-protective judgments of the political
branches. The answer must allow judicial action "in situations
where there is the most at stake in terms of personal freedom and the
political branches are most likely to over-react"-when the government deems it necessary to restrict the most cherished liberties of
American civilians to guard the nation's security. 84
In this special situation, heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate because it addresses the inherent weakness in the system of
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS BRANCHES 206 (1981) ("Judges are . . . better

WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE

able than politicians to avoid the dangers
accompanying constitutional evolution by practice. When ruling on the authority of the President or Congress, courts are less likely to adopt self-servicing interpretations.").
182. That debate, whether labeled strict constructionism versus activism, interpretivism
versus non-interpretivism, or positivism versus natural law, centers upon the undemocratic
character of judicial invalidation of decisions by the elective branches, especially when the
individual rights protected are not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. See J. ELY,
supra note 11.
183. Calling for a "more searching judicial inquiry" in his much-discussed footnote in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), former Chief Justice
Stone cited the precarious political position of "discrete and insular minorities" in a democratic
society as distinguished from those with access to the political process. Notwithstanding Justice
Rehnquist's objection to the vagueness of this formulation of "suspect classifications"
(Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 643, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)), the Court has
on at least three recent occasions suggested that those groups excluded from the institutional
political process are.deserving of particular judicial solicitude. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 128 (1973)) ("[the class to be a suspect must be, among
other alternatives,] relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from majoritarian political process."); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971) ("Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority..
. for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate"; but see Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291, 296 (1978)). Concerning the practical problems with Justice Stone's formulation see
J. ELY, supra note 11, at 151.
184. See supra notes 15-18.
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majority rule; 8 ' it is consistent with the principle of separation of
powers as modified by some overlap of jurisdiction to provide checks
to excessive power in any branch;"8 ' it is consistent with the purpose
of the Bill of Rights-to protect the most precious freedoms of individuals from unwarranted intrusions by the executive and legislative
branches; and it is consistent with the bulk of the Supreme Court's

18 7
Even joint congreswar powers decisions over the last 130 years.
88
sional and executive war power action' does not eliminate the role
of a "watchful" judiciary when fundamental liberties are at stake.
The force of political constituencies on the elective branches can be

overwhelming during crisis.' 89 Congress, like the President, is subject
to pressure from political constituencies, and its system of majority
185. See supra notes 181 and 183. See also Note, supra note 16, at 1294. ("A legislature as well as an executive is subject to popular pressures to overreact to a disturbance"). See
generally Keynes, supra note 104, at 70. ("Judicial review is an important element in a constitutional system that restrains democratic impulses ....Indeed, the purpose of constitutionalism is to limit popular sovereignty and governmental power."); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A.
Hamilton) (argued for judicial review of constitutional disputes because the judiciary was
uniquely positioned to protect the rights of individuals against excesses by the political
branches).
186. The Constitution's framers opted for a modified system of separation of powers to
assure adequate checks to excessive power. See Freidman, supra note 15, at 214 (citing Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 252, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1867); Sterling v. Constantin,
287 U.S. 385, 401 (1932) ("[W]hat are the allowable limits of military discretion [where civil
liberties are restricted], and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are
judicial questions."); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967) ("[Tihe phrase 'war
power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation ... [and] the concept of 'national defense'
cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to
promote such a goal."); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Black,
J., concurring) ("The word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not
be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment."); United
States District Court v. United States, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972) ("The danger to political
dissent is acute where the government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to
protect "domestic security."); Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246-48 (1974) (discussing traditional "suspicion and skepticism" of military power "since it often involves suspension of our
most cherished rights.").
188. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) delineated levels of executive authority depending on its "conjunction or
disjunction" with congressional action. Under this scheme, presidential power is at its maximum when the President acts pursuant to congressional authorization; it is in a zone of "twilight" when the President acts solely upon his inherent powers while Congress is silent; it is at
its "lowest ebb" when the President contravenes the will of Congress. Id. at 637. Accord
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1983) (upholding the President's freeze under the
Trading with the Enemy Act on Iranian assets in the United States).
189. The argument is unpersuasive that courts should not intervene in crisis decisionmaking because the executive is better able than Congress, and because Congress is better able
than the courts to deal with crises. The issue is not who is able to deal with crises most swiftly
and thoroughly, but whether constitutional standards are followed in doing so.
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rule provides no inherent protection of minorities lacking access to
political processes.19 Indeed, Hirabayashi and Korematsu involved
joint action. 9 Rapid congressional enactment of criminal penalties
following Executive Order No. 9066 hardly served as a check to executive and military excesses. 1 2 Even the replacement provision of
the now repealed Emergency Detention Act of 19501' would not
have prohibited the evacuation and internment because Congress was
deemed to have ratified the executive and military orders.
D. The Judicial Method
Through textual construction of the Constitution and interpretation of societal values, courts have demonstrated competence to
make the threshold identification of constitutionally protected liberties. 94 Outside the national security context, a substantial body of
law has developed which identifies those personal liberties that deserve special constitutional protection in the form of heightened judicial solicitude. 95
The more complicated issue follows the threshold determination. In applying a heightened standard of review to restrictions of
selected civil liberties, are courts competent to scrutinize the govern190. See supra notes 181-83.
191. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. at 102-04.
192. For an analysis of the powerful constituent political forces influencing the executive
and military orders, including agribusiness and anti-Asian organizations, see CWRIC, supra
note 10, at chapters I and 2.
193. "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress." PuB. L. No. 91-128 § 1(a) (1971), 85 Stat. 346 (amending
18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970)).
194. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward:In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for New Equal Protection.86 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1972).
195. The Court has identified several "fundamental rights." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (privacy regarding abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (privacy regarding contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Bullocks v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (the right to vote);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the right to interstate travel); William v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the first amendment); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (right to an adequate criminal defense). Compare Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (right to work is not a fundamental right); San
Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education is not a fundamental
right).
See generally Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1162,1184
(1977) ("Constitutional law must now be understood as the means by which effect is given to
those ideas that from time to time are held to be fundamental."). But see J. ELY, supra note
11 (criticizing the non-interpretivist approach of ascertaining fundamental values not specifically embodied in the text of the amendments to the Constitution).
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ment's claim of military necessity or national security as justification
for the restriction? The principal concern sometimes raised is
whether independent scrutiny will quickly embroil courts in policy
choices concerning constantly changing technical, political and security concerns which are not subject to judicially manageable
standards.

96

When the government asserts military necessity or national security as justification, it asserts that "although this restriction would
be impermissible under ordinary conditions, the existence of extraordinary danger to the nation's security compels it and thus legitimates it."' 97 Judicial inquiry therefore should focus first on the danger: whether credible information establishes that Americans
intentionally or otherwise pose a danger to legitimate government
security interests. 98 If the danger exists, then the government has a
compelling interest'" in eliminating it, and the inquiry shifts to the
196. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (the Court deemed it beyond its
competence to establish detailed rules for the training, weaponry and order of National Guard
troops and to supervise implementation to assure compliance). See generally Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving" the dispute indicates a non-justiciable political question).
Disputes about justiciability generally concern government actions which do not directly
affect fundamental liberties of American civilians, such as the initiation and conduct of hostilities, the weaponry, manpower and training of armed forces, external foreign policy matters,
and control over military personnel. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
197. "Necessity," as used here, encompasses the exigencies of war and national emergencies. Government actions purportedly justified by such exigencies are usually initiated by
the executive branch which is able to respond more quickly to crises than the legislative
branch. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 79 (1952). "Necessity"
also encompasses situations which could not properly be characterized as "emergency," but
which nevertheless appear to be of pressing concern to the security of the country. See, e.g.,
Robel v. United States, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
198. This formulation is limited to restrictions justified by danger posed by Americans
to government security interests because restrictions justified by the need simply to restore
order, such as temporary curfews following riots, may be appropriately evaluated by existing
principles of emergency law. For an excellent discussion of the predicates to emergency government action see Note, supra note 16, at 1294. Emergencies often call for far-reaching government action. To prevent overreaching, emergency measures must pass muster as to "whether
the emergency existed, and, more important, whether the measures taken were necessary to
restore order." Id. at 1296.
Outside of martial law the restriction of liberties of civilians "for their own benefit," has
only once been presented tothe Supreme Court as a basis of military necessity and the Court
there rejected that basis. See Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (the congressionally-sanctioned War Relocation Authority lacked inherent or delegated authority to continue to detain
concededly loyal Japanese Americans until it could find a "safe" place for their release).
199. Although the phrase "compelling interest" suggests the strict scrutiny standard of
review in equal protection challenges, its use here is not meant to be thus limited. It is used
broadly to reflect the significance or importance of dealing with a verifiable danger to legiti-
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tailoring of the restriction to the danger.20 0 These determinations are
essentially factual. They can be made in most instances on the basis
of proffered evidence according to judicially manageable standards,2 0 ' with due concern to the sensitivity of national security
20 2
information.
1. Existence of the Danger
Courts have a long history of adjudging the existence of bona
fide danger, 20 8 whether the initial determination is made by the military, the executive branch or Congress.
mate government security interests.
200. At least two post-World War II commentators recommended careful factual scrutiny by courts. Professor Rostow recommended that "there should be evidence in court that...
military judgment had a suitable basis in fact." Rostow, supra note 9, at 516. Nanette
Dembitz cited the need for a "strong affirmative showing in support" of a measure "affecting
fundamental liberties" rather than "merely the absence of a showing against it." Dembitz,
supra note 9, at 187. Although Dembitz used "reasonableness" as the standard, her definition
of reasonableness included government proof of the absence of "less stringent and more limited
alternatives." Id. at 188.
201. Another approach is the "hard look" principle of review which is used in administrative law. See generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); 5 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 410-11 (2d
ed. 1984).
Under the "hard look" approach, the court requires that government decisionmakers seriously and thoroughly consider all appropriate sources of information and alternative courses of
action, respond meaningfully to significant opposing viewpoints, and articulate the policy bases
for their choice of action. Responsibility for interpreting gray area information and for weighing conflicting policies rests with the executive and not with the courts. This approach imposes
a certain procedural discipline upon decisionmakers and thereby assures accountability by exposing government decisionmaking to the harsh light of the public eye without injecting the
judiciary into a realm of purely policy or highly technical matters. This approach plays to the
well-established procedural competence of the courts.
202. A thorough analysis of the problems with disclosure of sensitive information and of
methods for remedying those problems is beyond the scope of this article. See supra section
IV(c) for a general discussion of the issues and an outline of possible responses.
203. Has the government asserted a legitimate defense or security interest? Conceptually, the resolution of this issue might entail judicial inquiry into military or security operations. Practically, the issue arises rarely, if ever. The government's practice is to allege a threat
to an indisputably legitimate government interest, such as a functioning justice system
(Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)), or confidentiality concerning strategy about
the conduct of military hostilities (New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971)). It makes little sense for the government to assert an arguably trivial security interest,
and the government has not done so in its cases so far. Judicial attention is thus focused on the
veracity of the government's contention that its concededly legitimate interest is threatened.
(It will be interesting to see the position adopted by the government should litigation
result from the State Department's withdrawal of the security clearance of a homosexual employee of a contractor providing stenographical services to the White House because, according
to the employee, the government deemed his avowed homosexuality a "security risk." Washington Post, November 18, 1984, cols. 1-2).
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This inquiry essentially concerns the compelling circumstances
alleged by the government.2"" The actual state of mind (good faith
intentions) of those involved is irrelevant. There must be objective
evidence of the "nature and character" of the necessity at the time of
205

action.

Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Korematsu suggested
that "military decisions are not susceptible to judicial appraisal" because they "are made on information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not be proved." ' 6 The contents
of the government documents concealed from the Court and Justice
Murphy's analysis in his dissenting opinion indicate that Justice
Jackson was incorrect, at least in the Korematsu case, about judicial
appraisal of military decisions controlling ostensibly dangerous
American civilians.
In contrast, Justice Murphy's dissent scrutinized the DeWitt
Final Report, and subjected the military's determination of the danger of espionage and sabotage posed by West Coast Japanese Americans to accepted judicial methods of proof. He examined the military's assumption that ethnicity determines disloyalty and found it to
be based on "questionable racial and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military judgment, supplemented by
certain semi-military conclusions drawn from unwarranted use of
circumstantial evidence." 2
Citing the British system of loyalty
hearings during World War 11208 and the plodding pace of the Japanese evacuation, Justice Murphy found inadequate the DeWitt Re204. See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) (1867); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13
How. 115 (U.S. 1851); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 385 (1932); Duncan v. Kahanomoku,
327 U.S. 304 (1946); New York Times Co. v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972).
205. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 134-35 (U.S. 1851) (the government "must
show by proof the nature and character of the emergency, such as [the government] had reasonable grounds to believe it to be.").
Judicial inquiry into the nature and character of the "necessity" takes into account the
pressures of the moment underlying the government's action. Flexibility in accounting for exigent circumstances is necessary to prevent heightened scrutiny from being "strict in theory and
fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note 194, at 8. See Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 438 U.S. at 360-61 (opinion that a strict level of scrutiny could be applied without
being fatal in fact) (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring).
206. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice
Jackson deemed the evacuation unconstitutional not because of a lack of objective proof of
military necessity, but because of the harsh racial classification involved. This approach
amounted to an absolutist view of restrictive racial classifications since the government's asserted military justification for the restriction was irrelevant to the analysis.
207. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 241-42 n.16.
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port's unsubstantiated conclusion about "insufficiency of time." ' 9
He also found a complete lack of proof that the government's intelligence agencies did not already provide adequate safeguards against
espionage and sabotage. 10
The concealed original DeWitt Report and the ONI, FBI and
FCC reports filled the informational gaps identified by Justice Murphy. 1 ' They contained precisely the type of information amenable to
judicial methods of proof. The former impeached General DeWitt's
credibility concerning his conclusion of insufficiency of time. The latter provided solid, if not overwhelming, factual information contradicting DeWitt's pivotal conclusions about the widespread and uncontrollable danger of espionage and sabotage posed by Japanese
Americans. Competence to evaluate this type of information did not
fall exclusively within the realm of "military expertise."212
This conclusion, of course, is reached in hindsight, with knowledge of the undisclosed documents. It does, however, demonstrate the
danger of automatically deeming "unsusceptible to judicial appraisal" all decisions of military necessity or national security-especially those decisions involving the restriction of fundamental liberties of American citizens.
Indeed, in a variety of situations the Supreme Court has shown
an inclination to review congressional and executive determinations
of necessity, whether in examining the factual foundation of the asserted exigency or in defining the limits to the government's selfprotective executive power.2" Most recently in New York Times Co.
209. Id. at 241.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 30-51 and accompanying text.
212. Although certain military decisions fall exclusively within the realm of military
expertise, such as battlefield decisions and strategic troop and weaponry deployment (see supra
notes 171 and 174 concerning non-justiciability of such decisions), many other military decisions do not. See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) (1866).
213. See, e.g., Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) (1866) (see supra notes 105-09 and
accompanying text); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (U.S. 1851) (scrutinizing the government's broad contention of military necessity and finding insufficient credible information verifying the allegedly exigent circumstances); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (construing a federal statute under which the governor of Hawaii declared martial law, as not
authorizing the continued supplanting of civil courts with military tribunals after the threat of
invasion passed); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (reversing the post-discharge conviction of a former serviceman, noting the limit to congressional power to authorize military trials
of civilians to be "the least possible power to the end proposed"); Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 385 (1932) (finding insufficient evidence of "necessity" to justify a state military takeover
of private oil production during rebellion by oil producers); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (denying presidential authority to seize
and operate steel mills in the interest of national security because Congress had earlier, in
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v. United States, 14 the Court rejected the President's claim that the
executive branch, under its war and foreign policy powers and "in
the name of national security" could prohibit the publication of the
classified Pentagon Papers. The Court, however, could not agree on
a prevailing rationale, and its views were badly fragmented."" Most
interesting of the Court's seven opinions were those of Justices Brennan and Stewart.
Justice Brennan held that the first amendment tolerates no
prior judicial restraint on the press predicated on the mere surmise
or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. He declared
that although earlier cases had created a narrow exception when the
"nation is at war," ' prior restraints should be deemed proper only
upon "governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event
adopting a system of labor laws, expressly declined to confer that authorization of the executive
branch).
214. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
215. Justice Black's opinion took the absolutist approach to the first amendment. No
prior restraint is permissible. Justice Douglas acknowledged the power to wage war is the
"power to wage war successfully," Id. at 722. However, he found that the war power stems
from the declaration of war by Congress and that Congress had not declared war in this
instance. He therefore refused to decide "what leveling effect the war power of Congress might
have." Id. Justice White emphasized that at least in the absence of proper congressional authorization, the Executive bore a heavy burden in justifying prior restraints upon the press. In
concurring, Justice Marshall conceded that the President has broad powers by virtue of his
primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs and his position as Commander-inChief. Id. at 741. Justice Marshall found, however, that Congress twice rejected proposals to
confer upon the President the very powers he ostensibly exercised in this instance, and, citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), he concluded that the President therefore lacked authority to impose prior restraints in the interests of national security.
403 U.S. at 746-747.
216. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Schneck upheld the Espionage Act conviction and ten-year
sentence of a socialist accused of obstructing military enlistment by distributing literature urging draftees to oppose conscription peacefully, such as by petitioning for repeal of draft legislation. In articulating the "clear and present danger" test of the first amendment, Justice
Holmes implied that the danger need be less serious or impending to justify first amendment
restrictions if America is involved in war. Id. at 52.
The test is of doubtful vitality now - it operated to stifle "[tihe fundamental right of free
men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new institutions," Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 397 U.S. 444, 452 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing cases expansively
applying the test). The Court's significant implication that constitutional rights may be diminished by the existence of war abroad was contradicted in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.,
255 U.S. 81 (1921). Cohen invalidated as unconstitutionally vague a World War I federal
criminal statute concerning unreasonable pricing of goods. Citing Ex Parte Milligan and
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., the Court noted, in apparent conflict with
Schneck, that constitutional guarantees are not diminished by the mere existence of war. Accord, Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934) ("[The Constitution's] grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitations upon the power of the
States were determined in the light of emergency and they are not altered by emergency").
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kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea ....
21 7
no event may mere conclusions be sufficient.

In

Justice Stewart noted the executive branch's broad power over
national defense and international relations. He also acknowledged
that the prohibition of disclosure of some of the documents involved
appeared to be in the national interest. Justice Stewart nevertheless
deemed this insufficient grounds for prior restraint. His review of the
documents did not indicate that disclosure would "surely result in
direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its
people." 1 8
United States District Court v. United States,2" decided the following year, also limited the reach of executive authority. The Court
denied the executive branch unilateral authority to declare domestic
threats to national security to justify warrantless electronic surveillance of civilians. The Court acknowledged the president's power to
protect the government from internal subversion but, echoing Justice
Black's concern about the vague parameters of "national security" in
New York Times Co., the Court also noted the inherent dangers of
that power.22 In light of the danger of unchecked executive authority in conducting surveillance of civilians, the Court held that the
fourth amendment contemplates prior judicial approval of the necessity for domestic security surveillance. 2 1
217. 403 U.S. 714, 726-27 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
218. Id. at 730. The first amendment, according to the gist of these opinions, at least
during undeclared wars, does not tolerate prior restraint by the executive branch of political
publications, despite claims of national security, unless the government proffers proof of impending and material harm to the security of the country as a consequence of publication. See
generally Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Scheuer, a civil rights damage action
against state officials, arose out of the Ohio National Guard's killing of Kent State students
during an anti-war demonstration. The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the damage claim on "executive immunity" grounds. The Court held that public officials are only
entitled to "qualified immunity" (based on reasonable grounds coupled with good faith) for
accidents arising out of attempts to control the public's exercise of first amendment rights. Id.
at 246-48. The Court also held that the propriety of such immunity is a justiciable issue. Id. at
248-49.
219. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
220. Id. at 314. The opinion carefully limited its holding to "domestic security" surveillance and left undecided the warrant requirement for surveillance connected to foreign threats
to national security. Id. at 311.
221. Judicial review was limited to a probable cause determination. Id. at 321. Extending this principle, offspring of the Watergate era, Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), and Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), effectively held that damage actions are maintainable against officials of the executive branch as a result of warrantless surveillance violative
of the Omnibus Crime Control Act. See also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that
a general challenge to Army surveillance of civilian political dissidents did not present a case

KOREMATSU REVISITED

19861

In the cases discussed above, and in notes 187-88 the Court
faced general situations of considerable urgency-whether war at
home or overseas or domestic unrest. The Court nevertheless looked
beyond the general situation and examined the circumstances surrounding the specific government restriction at the time of its undertaking, and measured the government's contention of "necessity" according to the information then available. The pivotal issue, whether
expressly stated or implied, appeared to be the existence of available
credible evidence of the asserted exigency-did the information show
that the threat posed by American civilians was real? If so, of what
magnitude and imminence? These were essentially issues of fact
rather than policy-issues the Court then deemed were within its
province to resolve. These decisions did not entangle the Court in the
kind of determinations of political and military policy which underlie
decisions to initiate war or to train and deploy troops.2 "
2.

Less Restrictive Alternatives

The debate22 appears to have quieted concerning judicial competence to make the "difficult evaluation of relative costs, effectiveness, and restrictiveness of alternative measures."" 4 Judicial review
of less restrictive alternatives is now a generally accepted principle.
The Supreme Court has undertaken that analysis in many contexts:
under the equal protection clause in applying a strict scrutiny standard of review; 22 ' under the commerce clause; 226 under the contracts
or controversy, but cautioning that, at least in peacetime, such surveillance would present a
justiciable controversy when individuals are actually injured).
222. See supra Section Ill(B) concerning areas of political and military policy deemed
beyond judicial competence.
223. Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969)
(courts are not competent to evaluate effectiveness of alternative measures); Struve, The Less
Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967)
(the judicial method provides adequate tools for evaluating alternative measures).
224. Note, supra note 16, at 1298-99 ("[W]hile a court will inevitably encounter some
difficulty in evaluating the cost, effectiveness and restrictiveness of various ... measures, the
application of a less-restrictive alternative test is not beyond judicial competence.").
The author maintains that the cost of alternative measures should be irrelevant to the
Court's analysis at least as long as there is no question of exhausting available resources.
Higher costs are acceptable because of the "value we place on the protection of individual
liberties." Id. at 1299. Restrictiveness can be evaluated through overbreadth analysis or
through comparison of the alternative with restrictions of the same liberty in other situations.
Id. at 1300.
225. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirement for
voting not narrowly tailored to state's interest in fair elections and knowledgeable voters);
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voting requirement of property
ownership or parentage of school children not precisely tailored to state's interest in voters
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clause; 22 7 under the first amendment; 2 8 and in other situations.2 9
The general analytical approach to less restrictive alternatives is
substantially unaltered by the infusion of national defense or security
concerns. Indeed, the Court has applied "less drastic impact" and
"no greater than essential" standards in several cases involving national security restrictions imposed on first and fifth amendment
freedoms.23 0 Restrictiveness can be assessed through analysis of overinclusiveness-is the restriction so broad that it catches not only individuals who pose a threat to the government's security but also those
who do not?28 1 Restrictiveness can also be assessed through analysis
of overkill-does the restriction of those posing some threat go beyond what is necessary to meet the danger?2" 2 If the answer is affirmative in either situation, the inquiry proceeds to whether the restriction can be reformulated in concept to cure the problems of
overinclusiveness or overkill. If it can, the final query is whether the
narrowed restriction effectively meets the danger."
This determination does not entail a detailed projection of the
restriction's effect on all possible situations. Rather it simply assures
"primarily interested" in school affairs).
226. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (alternative measures
could have promoted community health without prohibiting certain interstate sales of milk).
227. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 347 U.S. 1 (1977) (state subsidy of rail
passenger transportation could be accomplished by available means other than a repeal of
statutory covenants).
228. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (moral fitness of teachers could be determined without requiring disclosure of all organizational connections); Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 40 (1960) (ban on distribution of all handbills imprecisely tailored to state's interest in
preventing fraud and false advertising).
229. For a collection of other cases, predominantly concerning analysis of reasonable
alternatives to economic regulations, see Wormouth & Merkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTA L. REV. 254, 267-93 (1964).
230. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1968); Aptheke v. Secretary of State, 387
U.S. 500 (1964); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a federal statute
prohibiting draft card burning because, inter alia, that means for assuring immediate draft
status identification was no greater than essential in view of the limited intrusion upon the first
amendment freedoms involved); Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985) (following the
O'Brien formulation in rejecting a draft registration protester's claim of selective prosecution of
only those nonregistrants actively opposing registration). Cf United States v. Albertini, 105 S.
Ct. 2897 (1985).
231. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (relocating concededly
loyal Japanese Americans allegedly due to insufficiency of time to identify the disloyal); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 342, 351-52 (1949)
(over-inclusiveness analysis in equal protection context).
232. See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968) (suggesting invalidity of a
merchant marine security screening program requiring disclosure of membership in 250 listed
organizations).
233. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1968).
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that the reformulated restriction is designed in concept to achieve
"the same basic purpose" as the original restriction."3 4 The Court
does not approve the specific structure and operation of any alternative.2" It merely sets the conceptual guidelines that the Constitution
will tolerate and leaves implementation to the political branches.23 6
The Court thus avoids advisory opinions"' and immersion into a
quicksand of technical detail and political policy. "
3.

Confidentiality

Related to the analysis of judicial competence is confidentiality.
What standards determine the government's obligation to disclose
relevant, although sensitive, information? What protective measures
assure confidentiality when limited disclosure is appropriate? This
article does not examine closely the first issue.2" 9 Rather, it identifies
some of the problems concerning confidentiality upon disclosure and
234. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (the restriction "must be viewed in
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose").
235. The Court has been criticized for invalidating restrictions without "specifying with
particularity the less restrictive alternative upon which it based its decision." Note, supra note
16, at 1298.
236. In finding that a restriction can be reformulated to have less drastic impact on
fundamental liberties, the court delineates conceptual guidelines for reformation. It leaves implementation to the responsible body intimately familiar with the intricacies and nuances of the
problem. Within the constitutional parameters set by the court, those involved with implementation have considerable room to assure maximum effectiveness. See discussion of United States
v. Robel, supra note 151(d) and accompanying text.
237. Note, supra note 223, at 471.
238. Consideration of the government's often subtle, often changing political message
underlying the restriction is unnecessary. The government's storehouse of domestic political
and foreign policy messages is vast. If fundamental liberties of Americans are unduly restricted, the government should shoulder the burden of finding alternative means for conveying
its political messages.
239. Standards concerning disclosure are somewhat ambiguous and implicate significant
policy conflicts. Exhaustive analysis is beyond the scope of this article. In brief, Nixon v.
United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) determined that the executive has no absolute privilege to
ignore judicial process requiring disclosure of relevant information. The weighing approach
suggested in Nixon identifies the competing concerns but provides little practical guidance.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985) suggested a
three-part inquiry: "The first is whether Wayte made a sufficient showing of [the merits of his
claim] to be entitled to any discovery. The second is whether the documents and testimony
ordered released were relevant to Wayte's . . claim, that is, whether the scope of discovery
was appropriate. The third is whether Wayte's need for the materials outweighed the Government's assertion of executive privilege." Id. But see CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985) in
which Chief Justice Burger indicated that courts are not competent to "weigh" the various
"subtle" factors involved in determining whether disclosure of assertedly confidential national
security information is appropriate. Justice Marshall's dissent argued that Congress in amending the National Security Act of 1947 expressly provided for judicial scrutiny of executive
determinations of confidentiality. Id.
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outlines existing judicial procedures.
As demonstrated by the Watergate scandal, disclosure of the
foundations of government action is a positive value in a democratic
society. For most actions disclosure serves as a check to abuses of the
political process and entails little or no resulting public harm. Disclosure of sensitive national security material in satisfaction of judicial proof requirements, however, can be harmful. Are there procedures for assuring strict confidentiality when necessary? For context,
it should be noted that of the multitude of war power and national
security cases, extremely few have seriously raised the disclosure
issue. 4 °
Generally adequate procedures exist for protecting materials in
court possession. In camera review of sensitive material and sealing
of records limit access to the judge and possibly her law clerks. The
procedure has been successfully employed in several cases. In New
York Times, 41 the Supreme Court reviewed in camera the Pentagon
Papers and determined that their contents did not justify prior restraint of publication. Federal district court Judge John Sirica in
Nixon 4 ' listened in camera to the Nixon Watergate tapes to determine if national security would be imperiled by public disclosure. In
United States District Court,'4 ' the district court reviewed in camera
transcripts of tapes of an informant to determine that domestic security concerns did not justify warrantless electronic surveillance. Most
recently the federal court established a procedure involving panels of
three federal appellate judges for review of government claims of
confidentiality.'4
When disclosure is deemed appropriate for litigation purposes,
a gag order is another response to any continuing concern about confidentiality. A court can order nondissemination of pretrial discovery
materials under a threat of criminal contempt without violating a
party's first amendment rights, even if the party is the press. 245 No
240. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (potential security risks in disclosing confidential information to a magistrate or judge are insufficient justification for eliminating the search warrant requirement; adequate protective measures exist), Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Majority ignored pivotal issue concerning propriety of District Court's discovery order requiring disclosure of governmental documents pertaining to defendant's charge of selective
prosecution).
241. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
242. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
243. 407 U.S. at 301.
244. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1982 (originally enacted as
PuB. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)).
245. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S.C,. 2199, 2209-10 (1984) ("[W]here ...a
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further public disclosure is then made. Justice is served as to the
individual litigant. Although first amendment concerns are implicated, this concern would arguably be tempered by the continuing
concern about confidentiality.
4.

Summary

The judicial method appears to be flexible and sturdy enough to
accommodate the suggested principle. When heightened scrutiny is
called for, courts will be able to draw on a history of demonstrated
competence in reviewing the existence of the danger and the tailoring
of the means, and will have several options for addressing concerns
about confidentiality.
V.

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

The need for the judicial adoption and clear articulation of the
suggested principle arises out of salutary policy and sound constitutional values. Its adoption would bring a measure of clarity to now
ambiguous guidelines for future governmental conduct. The potentially disastrous ramifications of continued ambiguity are illustrated
by the Korematsu case itself in which the Court deferred to the government's unexamined assertion of military necessity and thereby
sanctioned the tragic and unjustified deprivation of personal liberty.
Significantly, the suggested principle may be adopted without
upsetting settled doctrine. None of the recent cases, or other precedents upholding government deprivations of civil liberties, have held
as a matter of general constitutional principle that the standard of
judicial review normally applicable is obviated or attenuated by the
government's assertion of military or national security concerns. Nor
have any of these cases explicitly held that judicial deference to government self-protective actions is appropriate, especially when fundamental liberties of civilians are curtailed.
The suggested principle will not upset settled doctrine because
in most cases prior to 1978, the Supreme Court's level of scrutiny
implicitly was determined by ordinary constitutional doctrine which
focused on the liberty interest involved. Demanding judicial scrutiny,
when ordinarily appropriate, was not obviated by military or national security concerns underlying the government's restrictions in
those cases. Those concerns were accounted for within the frameprotective order is entered on a showing of good cause, . . . is limited to the context of pretrial
civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other
sources, it does not offend the first amendment.").
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work of the heightened standard of review."4 6 While recent cases
might suggest a new value judgment by the Court in giving greater
weight and deference to the government in cases involving alleged
national security interests, no constitutional doctrine explicitly providing such deference has yet been created. 47
An accommodation of government self-protective powers and
civil liberties is essential to a functioning and humane society. The
government must be empowered to repel actual threats to its existence. At the same time, especially in an era of expanding government control over its own citizens in response to perceived threats to
national security, a constitutional democracy cannot afford to have its
courts withdraw from their historically "watchful" role over the
most cherished liberties of its people. Korematsu attests to this danger. In the final analysis, the significance of the suggested principle
of judicial review may lie in its articulation of important competing
constitutional values in a manner that attempts to accommodate
rather than subordinate them, and in its step toward clarifying currently murky standards of government accountability.

246. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying the
heightened first amendment standard); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967) (applying the least restrictive alternative test in a first amendment challenge); United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972) (the fourth amendment requires prior
judicial approval of electronic surveillance of Americans); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378,
403 (1932) (scrutinizing a state's finding of military necessity to control private oil production
in upholding a fifth amendment due process challenge); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 115, 134-35 (1852); (requiring proof of the military emergency to justify a taking of
property); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124-26 (1867) (acknowledging the judiciary's role as guardian of constitutional liberties during times of commotion in upholding a fifth
and sixth amendment challenge to a military trial of a civilian).
247. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

